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Chapter One: An Introduction and Review of Literature 
 
Introduction 
In the lead up to the 2014 Egyptian elections, presidential hopefuls Hamdeen Sabahi and Abdel-
Fatah el-Sisi hit the campaign trail with policy platforms hinging on economic reform, social 
justice, and security. As the candidates outlined their vision for a new Egypt, they singled out 
development as the primary tool for implementing this vision. Desert development, or the 
development of Egypt’s vast desert landscape forming the country’s western and southern 
borders, was a recurrent theme. During a live television interview in May, Sabahi announced 
that, according to his own estimates, “three million feddans of [Egypt’s] desert could be made 
inhabitable.”1 In a separate interview that same month, Sisi outlined a broad development plan 
for the governorates, singling out the upper-Egyptian city of Sohag as having “more than one 
million acres of agricultural land” fit for development.2 
A few days before the election, Sisi’s campaign website published a color-coded “Map of 
the Future” detailing the soon-to-be-president’s strategy for encouraging investment and reviving 
Egypt’s struggling economy.3 At the center of this strategy was the construction of new desert 
cities, which would expand Egypt’s inhabitable land from the current six percent to a whopping 
one hundred percent. According to the campaign, these “new administrative and investment 
maps for the provinces” would “clear the way” for Sisi’s “vision … to achieve unprecedented 
                                                          
1
 “Sabbahi in TV interview: The Armed Forces are the People’s Property,” Mada Masr, 9 May 2014, 
http://www.madamasr.com/content/sabbahi-tv-interview-armed-forces-are-peoples-property. 
2
 Mada Masr, Twitter post, 18 May 2014, 8:41 PM, https://twitter.com/MadaMasr/status/468099133115736066  
3
 The campaign website (http://www.sisi2014.net/index.php) is now defunct, and the map was taken down soon 
before the elections.”Sisi Campaign Posts Brief Program on New Website, Mada Masr, 21 May, 2014. 
”http://www.madamasr.com/content/sisi-campaign-posts-brief-program-new-website  
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rates of development and effect a quantum leap in the Egyptian economy.”4 Included were 
details for forty-eight new cities, eight airports, new fish farms, and several renewable energy 
projects, at an estimated cost of 140 billion US dollars. 
As Sisi explained during the launch of his electoral program, “the key to my vision is 
decisions and approaches that open the doors to modernization, labor, development, and 
diligence before all Egyptians equally.” His vision for Egypt’s future was, Sisi explained, “the 
first of its kind.”5 However, the history of development schemes under past Egyptian presidents, 
including Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak, tells a different story. These 
presidents also launched large-scale development schemes targeting Egypt’s desert, and the 
rhetoric around these projects shared similar promises of economic prosperity and modernization 
through technological planning. For these presidents, Sisi included, the solution to Egypt’s 
pressing social, political, and economic problems was human intervention in the geographic 
landscape under a framework of massive development projects. 
Thus Sisi’s desert development project is one of many in a region that has been an object 
of development for both national and international actors alike. While Nasser’s Aswan High 
Dam or Mubarak’s New Valley Toshka scheme are more well-known examples, countless small 
development projects have invested in “making the desert bloom,” with varying degrees of 
success. There is a substantial amount of literature that seeks to measure the success of such 
projects and ascertain the prospects for future desert development. This research takes a different 
approach, looking instead at the history of these projects and how they contribute to a larger 
                                                          
4
 Stephen Kalin, “Sisi’s Economic Vision for Egypt: Back to the Future,” Reuters, May 22, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/22/us-egypt-sisi-economy-idUSBREA4L0KL20140522 
5
 Ibid. 
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story of modern state formation, global power politics, and, ultimately, social and political 
dispossession.  
In April 2014, one month before his interview on Egyptian TV, Sisi received a delegation 
of Nubian leaders in order to “showcase his vision for the development of Upper Egypt.”6 Sitting 
in a lavish garden, Sisi explained his plans to develop “Nubia,” and entertained suggestions from 
the delegates in this regard. In order to examine the history of development in Egypt’s south and 
west desert, it is important to highlight the experiences of those whom this development has most 
directly affected. As the record of Egypt’s development shows, it is not just “undeveloped” land 
that is an object of development, but also the very people who live on it. In the case of Egypt’s 
south and west desert regions, those people include the Nubians, a linguistically and tribally 
diverse group of people who used to inhabit parts of this land. From the Aswan dams of the early 
twentieth century to the Mubarak-era “Toshka” project, Egyptian Nubians have watched their 
land transform under the rubrics of progress, modernization, and development for over one 
hundred years. The planners behind these mega-projects position them as necessary for the 
greater Egyptian good. However, their tangible effect on the ground is less clear. For Nubians 
who lost their homes, lands, and traditional livelihood due to compulsory resettlement, the price 
of development is high. Their experience poses important questions about the value of these 
schemes in Egypt and beyond. This research offers a critical history of development in Egypt’s 
south and west desert regions through the lens of the Nubians, longstanding recipients of the 
imperative to “develop” land and people.  
Who are the Nubians? 
                                                          
6
 Gamal Abu el-Dahab and Ashraf Omran. “El-Sisi Welcomes Delegation from Nubia and Presents his Vision for 
the Development of Upper Egypt,” Al-Ahram, April 1, 2014, http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/474168.aspx  
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There is no simple answer to the question “who are the Nubians.” Historically speaking, the term 
“Nubian” denotes those people who settled south of the Nile’s first cataract, from Aswan to 
Dongola, in what is now Egypt and Sudan. “Nubia” (which, for the purposes of this research 
denotes a dynamic and constantly-shifting space of land below Aswan) long predates territorial 
notions of Egypt and Sudan.  It was on these lands that the ancient Kingdom of Kush reigned 
intermittently from before the third millennium B.C. until 350 A.D. At first glance, it may seem 
odd to describe a contemporary group of people by a civilization that existed several thousand 
years ago. Much as discussions of contemporary Egyptians often begins with references to 
Egypt’s Pharonic history, so too do many people (Nubians included) inextricably link the notion 
of “Nubians” and “Nubia” to an ancient past. This referent includes both national mythologies 
and international conversation efforts.  
 Needless to say, referring to Nubians today as descendants of an ancient people does little 
to elucidate on the vast diversity of this group. For starters, there are native Nubian populations 
in Egypt, as well as in Sudan.
7
 This work focuses on Nubians in Egypt. These Nubians 
distinguish among themselves in a number of ways. There are well over fifty different Nubian 
villages, each with their own histories. There are two different languages that Nubians speak, 
Kenzi and Fadicca. A Kenzi speaker will not understand Fadicca, and vice-versa. Because of the 
compulsory relocations that Nubians faced since the early twentieth century due to the 
construction of dams near Aswan, very few Nubian villages remain in their original locations. 
The original villages that do still exist are located near Aswan city and West Aswan. There are 
many Nubians living outside of Egypt in the Gulf, Europe, and the United States. There are also 
                                                          
7
 In addition to the native Nubians in Egypt and Sudan, there is a sizable community in Kenya, which arrived during 
the 1890s as soldiers in the British army. See Duncan, Rachuonyo. “Nubians in Kenya: A People Denied.” Think 
Africa Press. 22 February 2013. http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/people-denied-nubians-kibera  
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Nubians who settled in cities across Egypt, such as Cairo and Alexandria. There is a young 
generation of Nubians who have never even visited “Old Nubia,” which refers here to the land 
between the Nile’s first cataract and the Egyptian border with Sudan, a rough approximation of 
the region where Nubians in Egypt used to live. Some Nubians may not even self-describe as 
Nubian, but rather as Egyptian, Egyptian-Nubian, African, Islamist, or Socialist, or any number 
of labels of self-identification.  
 When this research refers to “Nubians,” it is with the understanding that this includes a 
very large number of people. This thesis focuses on Nubians who were forced to relocate due to 
the construction of dams in Aswan, and it features input from Nubians who are still living in 
Egypt today. This input comes from Nubian news publications, Nubian groups on social 
networking websites, as well as from a small number of interviews I conducted in both Aswan 
and Cairo in June 2014. However, I cannot claim to provide a comprehensive account of this 
diverse group of people who have dynamic and contenting perspectives on resettlement, 
development, and the future of their former lands. 
Historical Background 
The exploration and development of Nubian lands, namely in the diversion of the Nile’s 
waters for irrigation purposes, did not begin in the twentieth century. However, this research 
begins with the Nasser period because it represents an important juncture for Egypt’s emergence 
as a modern nation. In 1952, Mohamed Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser led the Free Officers 
coup, forcing the abdication of the Egyptian King Farouk and bringing an end to the Mohammad 
‘Ali dynasty in Egypt. After the brief presidency of Mohamed Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser 
became, as the popular saying goes, “the first Egyptian to rule Egypt since Cleopatra.” Although 
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the formation of a “modern” state in Egypt was arguably underway since the nineteenth century, 
this was a decisive moment for the articulation of an Egyptian state both by and for Egyptians.
8
 
With the withdrawal of King Farouk and the demolition of an important channel for continued 
British influence, Nasser attempted to break the yoke of foreign elements in Egypt. Nasser’s 
Egypt would go on to assert itself as a dominant force in the Arab world. By nationalizing the 
Suez Canal in 1956 in order to fund the construction of the High Dam at Aswan, Nasser 
proclaimed Egypt’s “new” sovereignty. The High Dam at Aswan highlighted the notion of 
development as the cornerstone of Nasser’s vision for sovereignty. Not only would the Aswan 
Dam allow for the cultivation of new lands, but it would also contribute to Egypt’s rapid 
industrialization through the electricity that hydropower made possible.  
The overthrow of the monarchy also had important implications for Egypt’s relationship with 
Sudan. Since 1821, Egypt had held intermittent control over Sudanese territory. While the 
Mahdist revolt of 1884 briefly removed Egypt’s hold over Khartoum, a British-led campaign in 
1898 re-annexed the Mahdi territories to Egypt. Because the British had informally occupied 
Egypt since 1882 (following the ‘Urabi revolution), the administration of Sudan, as that of 
Egypt, would remain under tight British supervision for the next decades.
9
 After Nasser seized 
power in Egypt, Sudan voted for independence and became an autonomous country in January 
1956. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between the two nations granted Egypt the right to 
construct the Aswan High Dam, which would create the largest man-made lake in the world, 
flooding the border region on both sides. The issue of borders is a contentious one, especially for 
those people settled in said zones of contention. The states governing Egypt and Sudan’s new 
                                                          
8
 The slogan “Misr lel Misriyeen” was popular among Egyptian nationalists, and it featured prominently in earlier 
uprisings against foreign influence such as the ‘Urabi revolution at the turn of the nineteenth century.  
9
 Eve Trout Powell, A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan 
(Berkeley: U of California, 2003), 5. 
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borders now had the power to absorb and account for these people. In the case of Egypt and 
Sudan, these were the so-called “Nubians,” a linguistically and tribally diverse group straddling 
the newly-affirmed border between the two countries. After centuries of living on the land, 
Nubian homes and historical monuments faced submersion at the hands of the High Dam’s lake. 
As preparations for the dam went underway, Egypt and Sudan prepared to relocate the Nubians 
to make way for the flood. With that, Nubia’s population of roughly 100,000 was divided into 
two. The Egyptian government began the process of absorbing 50,000
10
 newly-declared 
“Egyptian” Nubians into its citizenry. The 50,000 Nubians on the Sudanese side would embark 
on a parallel, but also very different, journey to citizenship. 
As mentioned above, the Aswan High Dam was not the first technological feat to disrupt 
Egypt’s border to the south. Khedive Abbas II, with the guidance of British administrators in 
Egypt, constructed the first dam at Aswan in 1902 as part of a larger British initiative to 
regularize the Nile’s water and increase irrigation. The dam was subsequently raised two times, 
in 1912 and 1933. While this dam did not create a standing lake, it did require the periodic 
flooding of Nubia, as well as resettlement for those affected Nubians. The 1963-1964 Nubian 
relocation scheme was much larger in scale, involving the resettlement of most Nubian 
communities. Unlike the previous relocations, this experience was coupled with the Egyptian 
state’s increasing intervention into Nubians lives at unprecedented levels. 
The 1963-1964 resettlement, and the construction of the High Dam at Aswan, brings to light 
several important features of the post-colonial state-building projects that occurred across Arab 
nations. After sixty years of informal British occupation (not to mention centuries of Ottoman 
                                                          
10
 Alia Mossallam, “Hikayat Sha’b—Stories of Peoplehood: Nasserim, Popular Politics and Songs in Egypt 1956-
1973” (PhD diss., the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012). 179. All accounts of the Nubian 
relocation state that the Egyptian government relocated 50,000 Nubians during the relocation process; it is not a 
disputed figure. 
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administration that preceded it), the question of sovereignty was at stake. Linked to the 
consolidation of the state’s authority to govern itself was an investment in development, 
demography, industry, and economy. The Aswan Dam required knowledge of land and water 
resources. It also necessitated the manipulation of this land and its translation into new sources of 
hydropower to increase agricultural and industrial capacity. To realize this broad constellation of 
concerns, technology and expertise became crucial objectives for the Nasserist state. The state’s 
drive for knowledge also implicated Nubians, a formerly peripheral population existing largely 
outside Egyptian government administration. The 50,000 new Nubian citizens had to be brought 
into the mainstream Egyptian fold, both administratively and culturally. This imperative required 
establishing a baseline understanding of who these people were, including their numbers, 
demographic characteristics, cultivation habits, and their cultural practices. The collection of 
knowledge on Egypt’s Nubians and the new services and institutions that the Egyptian 
government introduced all occurred under a particular discourse of development. 
Approaches to Development Theory 
This research looks at development practices in Egypt through the lens of Egypt’s Nubians. 
While that may seem like a fittingly narrow statement of purpose, in reality it is quite broad. 
“Development,” as Wolfgang Sachs suggests in the introduction to The Development Dictionary, 
“has become an amoebalike concept, shapeless but ineradicable. Its contours are so blurred that it 
denotes nothing—while it spreads everywhere because it connotes the best of intentions.”11 
Development, in other words, means many different things to many different people. In order to 
say that this research examines Nubians and development, it is important to clarify what is meant 
by development and the particular theoretical approach to development that this research takes.  
                                                          
11
 Wolfgang Sachs, The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power, 2nd ed. (London: Zed, 2010). 
10 
 
Perhaps it is best to begin with the approaches to development theory that this research 
will not be taking. The field of development studies is theoretically and programmatically 
diverse. A standard development approach, then, would measure the economic or social 
development of Egypt’s Nubians since the Nasser period. When “development” entered common 
usage in the 1950s, its guiding theory was framed in terms of economic growth.
12
 These early 
proponents measured development through the growth of income per person.
13
 Development 
theorists call this the classic liberal development theory, which emphasized economic growth 
through capital accumulation. The “historical stages” approach to this classic liberal theory 
(popularized by theorists such as W.W. Rostow), and the closely-related modernization theory, 
envisioned a linear history of all societies, with a similarly uniform development process.
14
 
Popular among sociologists in the 1950s and 1960s, this theory articulated certain “ideal social 
structures and institutions for sustained development,” emphasizing the need for an overhaul of 
“underdeveloped” peoples’ values and norms and “the flow of foreign aid, trade, investment, 
technical assistance” and large-scale infrastructure projects to achieve development.15 Another 
popular current of development thought emerging in the 1950s was the Structuralist/ 
Institutionalist school, which saw the failure of the price system as the source of economic 
problems for the underdeveloped. Popularized by theorists such as Raul Prebisch, this theory 
advocated “inward-looking development based on state protected and direct import substituting 
industrialization (ISI).”16 
                                                          
12
 Gustavo Esteva, “Development” in The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power, ed. Wolfgang 
Sachs (London: Zed, 2010). 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ron Ayres, “Schools of Development Thought” in Development Studies: An Introduction through Selected 
Readings, ed. Ron Ayres (Dartford: Greenwich UP, 1995), 98. 
15
 Ibid., 98. 
16
 Ibid., 99. 
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However, over time, it became clear to development theorists that measuring 
development through economic growth alone was not enough. The idea of “social” development 
emerged. International bodies such as the United Nations perceived this notion as a counter-part 
to the discrete sphere of “economic” development. In 1963, the UN established the UN Research 
Institute for Social Development, with the aim of “integrated” development linking both 
economic and social growth.
17
 The resulting social theories of development focus on the role of 
“human capital” in development, and emphasize health and education as the key to economic 
growth. The neo-classical approach to development, which gained speed in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, identified the state’s centrality as the culprit of the field’s failures. According to this 
model, “distorted development” occurred because governments intervened to set prices or direct 
economic activity. To compensate for these past interferences, the theory suggests, governments 
should “roll back the frontiers of the state, liberalize all markets and pursue privatization” in 
order to achieve economic growth.
18
 This “pronounced and highly public” shift to liberal 
development policy, Michael Carter argues, was “part and parcel” of the “ultramodernist” 
critiques of post-World War II development economics. Eschewing statist policies focused on 
public investment and planning, this critique “roots itself in the singular validity and universal 
applicability of the basic theorems of neoclassic economics.”19 
This research does not seek to measure the development of Nubians by any of these 
standard theories of development. Indeed, it does not seek to measure the development of 
Nubians at all. Rather, this research engages with the work of a more recent wave of historians 
that situates development as both a product and a defining component of modernity. Instead of 
                                                          
17
 Esteva, “Development” 
18
 Ayres, “Schools of Development Thought,” 97. 
19
 Michael Carter, “Intellectual Openings and Policy Closures: Disequilibria in Contemporary Development 
Economics,” in International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of 
Knowledge, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley: California UP, 1997), 120. 
12 
 
engaging in the conversation over “what development is, or is not, or how it can be more 
accurately defined, better ‘theorized,’ or sustainably practiced,” this research frames 
development as discourse, an “interwoven set of languages and practices,” to understand how 
these texts “write and represent” the world.20 Development, from this perspective, is not a neutral 
act of improvement but rather “a modernist regime of knowledge and disciplinary power.”21 
Works from this tradition, which gained traction in the 1990s, include the 1992 Development 
Dictionary (ed. Wolfgang Sachs), Arturo Escobar’s 1995 Encountering Development: The 
Making and Unmaking of the Third World, the 1995 reader Power of Development (ed. Jonathon 
Crush, quoted above), and M.P Cowen and R. W Shenton’s 1996 Doctrines of Development, 
among many others.
22
 
Development: A Historical Perspective 
By approaching development as a “modernist regime of knowledge and disciplinary power,” this 
research casts the intersection of Nubians and development in a new light. It critiques the very 
idea of assessment by highlighting development’s role in building a modern Egyptian state, and 
the violence and exclusions such a process required. A historical approach to development 
understands the field of development theory, and all of its accompanying vocabulary such as 
“basic needs,” “population,” the “social” and the “economic,” as emerging out of specific 
historical contexts of empire and control. While “development,” and its counterpart 
“underdevelopment” entered common usage in 1949,23 the ideas behind it have a longer 
                                                          
20
 Jonathon Crush, “Introduction: Imagining Development,” in Power of Development, ed. Jonathon Crush (London: 
Routledge, 1995), 5. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 See Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree’s 1997 The Post-Development Reader, as well as Gustavo Esteva and 
Madhu Suri Prakash’s 1998 Grassroots Post-Modernism: Remaking the Soil of Cultures. 
23
 It was Harry Truman who initiated the contemporary understanding of development when he took office on 20 
January 1949 and announced “We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific 
13 
 
genealogy, rooted in the colonial experience. Many scholars have looked at the colonial period as 
an important moment when western nations were reformulating their identities and practicing 
new modes of modernity based on their experiences in the colonies. This scholarship argues that 
although modernity is associated with the West, it was not a creation of the West but rather “of 
the interaction between West and non-West.”24 Ann Stoler describes the process of modernity as 
a “mobile process of rupture and reinscription” by which themes and categories emerging in one 
historical context are displaced and reformulated once employed elsewhere.
25
 This idea might be 
similarly applied to development, and the related ideas of welfare and productivity, themselves 
emerging as new modes of rule during the colonial period. 
In his study of French and British colonial rule, Frederick Cooper provides some of this 
colonial context for development. According to Cooper, “colonial governments in the 1940s 
thought of development as an idea which would reinvigorate colonialism… [they] believed that 
their development initiatives would make colonies simultaneously more productive and more 
ideologically stable in the tumult of the postwar years.”26 Situating the development initiative 
within the imperial crisis of the 1940s, Cooper finds an “implicit social theory behind economic 
policy.”27 In the 1920s, the prevailing theory of “colonial self-sufficiency” assumed that 
development would “disrupt” colonial societies, and that state resources should target the 
metropole instead. However, a series of labor strikes, beginning in the mid 1930s in Trinidad and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas…. What we 
envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing” 
24
 Timothy Mitchell, “Introduction” in Questions of Modernity, ed. Timothy Mitchell (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007), 2. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept,” in 
International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge, ed. Frederick 
Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley: U of California, 1997), 64. 
27
 Ibid., 64 
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Jamaica and soon becoming widespread, caused authorities to reformulate this imperative.
28
 The 
1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act directed funds mainly at services, especially for 
urban workers, such as water, health, facilities, housing, and education. The theory was not, 
Cooper argues, to create a more efficient and productive colony to exploit, but rather it viewed 
“welfare – social services in the short run and a higher standard of living in the long” as the 
“antidote to disorder.”29 With that, “a ‘dual mandate’ started to be sketched: the conqueror 
should be capable of economically developing the conquered region and at the same time 
accepting the responsibility for caring for the well-being of the natives.
30” 
 When labor strikes continued, colonial governments created labor bureaucracies 
“alongside its growing development bureaucracy” and worked with African trade unionists in the 
hope of developing a framework for channeling workers’ protest, like those found in the 
metropole.
31
 In 1944, the “productionist side of the development-welfare nexus” emerged more 
clearly. Funding increased for the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, and metropole 
resources were now allocated for social services, so long as they contributed to a colonial 
production that would eventually pay for such services itself.
32
 In this post-war backdrop, the 
concept of “development” evolved in tandem with the ideological context of “self-
determination,” the new catch-phrase of international politics.33” Imperial powers needed a 
“progressive” reason for continuing colonial rule, while also capitalizing on whatever untapped 
resources the colonies could offer in desperate post-war financial times.
34
 The emphasis was now 
                                                          
28
 Ibid., 65-66 
29
 Ibid., 67 
30
 Esteva, “Development”  
31
 Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats,” 68. 
32
 Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats,” 68. 
33
 Ibid., 70 
34
 Ibid., 70 
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squarely on production, with an abstract end stage of “developed” for the colonies.35 Another 
wave of strikes in the late 1940s and 1950s pushed labor concerns to the forefront once again. 
British and French officials decided that “the solution to the social problem lay in European 
knowledge of how to manage a working class,” in which trade unions could not only “mold 
grievances into defined categories to which employers could respond,” but also “provide 
institutions through which workers would feel socially rooted in the city.”36 However, by the 
1950s, Cooper argues, it became clear that the concept of economic development could not bear 
the “enormous amount of political and economic weight” it was asked to carry. Colonial projects 
were too “top-heavy” and required enormous amounts of funding, planning, and expertise.37 
Increasingly unable to argue that development might solve the colonies’ political and economic 
problems, Cooper suggests, colonial powers directed their focus at forming “cooperative 
postcolonial relationships” rather than sustaining colonial rule.38 
Development and the Post-Colonial State 
Nasser’s Egypt provides an exemplary case of development’s role in nation-building in the post-
colonial context.
39
 Egypt was a nation emerging from a long history of foreign exploitation. The 
colonial experience in Egypt was not typical. Britain began its unofficial occupation in 1882, and 
during the World War I it declared Egypt a protectorate. Following the 1919 revolution, Britain 
dissolved the protectorate and granted Egypt independence, though it would continue to 
unofficially administer the country until 1952. A number of different agents – Ottoman, British, 
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and Egyptian – established the first institutions for welfare services and state interference in 
productivity long before the 1952 Revolution. Timothy Mitchell, in Colonising Egypt, identifies 
the rule of Ottoman commander Mohamed Ali as laying the foundations for the modern Egyptian 
state. However, as noted above, Nasser initiated a period of modern state building that was 
unprecedented in its scope and scale. If Mohamed Ali established the modern state in Egypt, 
Mitchell suggests, it was Nasser who inaugurated Egypt as a modern national state.
40
 The idea of 
sovereignty and freedom from foreign interference was a central tenant of the new Egyptian 
nation under Nasser. However, as with the case of many countries emerging from decades of 
colonial administration, assertions of sovereignty were true more in rhetoric than in practice. 
Cooper uses the example of Kwame Nkrumah who, alongside the British, guided the Gold Coast 
to independence in 1957 “with development as their shared goal.” Unlike his predecessors, 
Nkrumah was able to “out-flank and contain the labor movement” using the kind of “co-optation 
and repression” impossible under the British.41 Just as the colonizers thought development could 
carry the burden of political and social unrest, so too did post-colonial regimes engage with this 
framework to usher in a new period of prosperity for the nation. 
  Post-colonial states did not only use development as a means to obscure brewing social 
and political issues. Rather, as in Nasser’s Egypt, these new states constituted their very identity 
by way of development. As Sugata Bose demonstrates in his discussion of national development 
and the post-colonial state in India, an “insufficiently decolonized, centralized state structure 
seized upon national development as a primary source of its own self-justification. Instead of the 
state being used as an instrument of development, development became an instrument of the 
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state’s legitimacy.”42 Development, as Bose argues, was an important means for emerging 
modern states to cultivate their identity and centralize power. With clear parallels to Egypt under 
Nasser, Bose states that the centralizing modern state often resorts to “reductionist mega-science 
to buttress itself, to homogenizing development to legitimize itself and to anesthetizing 
rationality to transcend the “irrational” arena of politics.”43 “If postcolonial modernity is defined 
by the centrality of development,” Akhil Gupta suggests, “then populism, especially agrarian 
populism, is its most important feature.”44 
As Toby Jones shows in his study of Saudi Arabia, state power over land and resources, 
and the ability to manipulate those resources at will, goes “hand in hand with the power to 
determine, govern, and police the territoriality of the nation-state, and thus the sovereignty of the 
state itself.”45 For Egyptian president Nasser, constructing the Aswan High Dam allowed not 
only for the control of water and electricity, but also for a bold display of sovereignty in the 
wake of ongoing British intervention. Development provided the promise of change. Its neutral 
language, focused on the need to modernize and alter what were essentially geographic issues, 
served to obscure the real political and social problems at hand. 
Increasing state control of land and resources also translated into increased control of 
people. Emerging fields of global knowledge and international expertise, that institutions such as 
the Ford Foundation disseminated internationally, provided the tools and the demand to 
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modernize land, resources, and people. As Mitchell writes, “from the opening of the twentieth 
century to its close, the politics of national development and economic growth was a politics of 
techno-science, which claimed to bring the expertise of modern engineering, technology, and 
social science to improve the defects of nature, to transform peasant agriculture, to repair the ills 
of society, and to fix the economy.”46 The calculation of people and an understanding of 
demography became increasingly important as the Egyptian state committed itself to an 
extensive set of welfare services, much like the British and French colonial administrations. 
Egypt acted as a welfare state not along the model of industrialized countries of Western Europe, 
but rather in its provision of public goods such as free education, health benefits, and 
government employment. The state also assumed responsibility for the entire welfare of the 
relocating Nubians, including housing, food, education, and community services. This was a 
heavy weight for the state to carry and required a concurrent rise in productivity to sustain the 
costs.
47
 It is within this context that Nubians (alongside numerous other “peripheral 
populations”) became citizens of the Egyptian state. 
Who has the “Right to Develop”? 
To this day, scholars continue to debate about whether or not the Aswan High Dam has 
effectively ensured water security for Egypt. To be sure, the dam saved Egypt from famine 
during two major droughts in the early seventies and eighties. In Ethiopia, where the main source 
of the Nile’s waters is found, an estimated one million died from 1984 to 1985. At the same time,  
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scientists critique the dam for its larger environmental impact in Egypt. Lake Nasser’s 
entrapment of sediment that used to naturally fertilize Egypt’s soil meant that farmers 
increasingly had to rely on chemical fertilizers. The Nile’s changing water flow also affected the 
salinity of Egypt’s coastal waters, decimating sardine fisheries located near the mouth of Nile 
tributaries to the Mediterranean.
48
 However, regardless of the dam’s larger contribution to 
Egypt’s development, it also negatively affected Nubian life in very concrete ways. While the 
dam helped develop greater Egypt, it also contributed to what many Nubians would call the “de-
development” of their own communities. This poses an important question that the thesis 
addresses throughout: Who has the “right to develop”? The so-called development of Nubians 
and their land did not end with the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Since then, large-scale 
national development schemes such as Mubarak’s Toshka project have occurred on former 
Nubian lands without Nubian cooperation or consent. While Mubarak framed the Toshka project 
as the start of a new era for all Egyptians, it ultimately became a symbol of corruption and 
government over-expenditure during the Mubarak era. The largest landholders in Toshka are 
private companies, such as Saudia Arabian Prince Al Waleed bin Talal’s Kingdom Agricultural 
Development Company. As Egypt becomes the world’s largest importer of wheat, private 
companies in Toshka have contracts that permit the export of high-value crops to foreign 
markets. While land that was once barren has now been developed to support agriculture, the 
benefits of this development have not been felt by the average Egyptians or Nubian alike. 
 While all Egyptians lose in poorly-executed development schemes such as Toshka, it can 
be argued that Nubians stand to lose the most. It is perhaps surprising then that many Nubians 
actively call for development from the state. As Nubians fight for the “right to return” to their 
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former homes before the resettlement, this battle often merges with a larger Nubian claim to the 
“right to develop” their former homeland. Cooper argues that in the context of French and British 
colonial rule, development, which colonial administrators initially employed to quell dissent, 
also provided a language of resistance for the colonized. The “universalism of development 
discourse,” Cooper contends, allowed for the “firm assertion of people of all races to participate 
in global politics and lay claim to a globally defined standard of living.”49 Nubians were not 
passive recipients of development, and since the relocation they have vocally claimed their “right 
to develop” from the state. Looking at various Nubian-led development initiatives, this thesis 
argues that development discourses have been an important source of leverage for Nubians as 
they advocate for their rights. However, at the same time that Nubians call for the development 
of their former lands, development projects on those lands, such as Toshka, exclude Nubians 
from participation. Thus, this research argues that not everyone is given equal access to 
development despite the universalism of its creed. 
Dominant Paradigms in Nubian Studies and Departures 
The literature available on Nubians today is vast and multidisciplinary in scope.
50
 Archeologists 
and Egyptologists have long been interested in studying the historical artifacts located in former 
Nubian lands. From the nineteenth century onwards, numerous western institutions sent 
archeological missions to excavate and document monuments in Egypt’s south.51 This trend 
intensified after Nasser’s announcement to build the High Dam, when the United Nations 
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Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) inaugurated the “International 
Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia (1960-80)” in order to excavate and record the 
historical artifacts south of Aswan before the flood. The International Conference on Nubians 
Studies, which began in 1966, gathers every four years to present archeological findings in Nubia 
(from both Egypt and Sudan). 
 Alongside the campaign to document Nubian monuments before the flood was a 
concurrent campaign to document Nubian culture, language, and daily life. Although countless 
anthropologists have taken an interest in Nubians, one important example is the “Nubian 
Ethnological Survey,” which the Social Research Center at the American University in Cairo 
carried out from 1961-1963. The SRC team in Nubia included both American and Egyptian 
anthropologists. The work they produced formed the foundation of contemporary Nubian 
anthropological studies. These works, which many Nubians and non-Nubians alike reference to 
this day, include the Robert Fernea-edited Contemporary Egyptian Nubian (1966), Colin 
Callender’s Life-Crisis Rituals among the Kenuz (1971), Hussein Fahim’s Egyptian Nubians: 
Resettlement and Years of Coping (1983), Peter Geiser’s The Egyptian Nubian (1987), and John 
G. Kennedy’s Nubian Ceremonial Life (1978), among many others. 
 Contemporary anthropological studies of Nubia acknowledge its debt to these early 
scholars. However, this generation emphasizes the anthropological frameworks that guided 
research on Nubians in the sixties. The SRC researchers relied on the notion of “salvage 
anthropology,” which saw the Nubians as a traditional, tribal group on the brink of change and 
whose identity needed documentation lest it be lost forever. The treatment of Nubians as a group 
separate from mainstream Egyptians informs many past and contemporary studies. This research 
takes a different approach, building off the work of Elizabeth Smith. In her 2005 dissertation 
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“Tributaries in the Stream of Civilization,” Smith examines “the significance of Nubians in the 
national context and their role in shaping contemporary national identity.” Instead of looking at 
Nubians as a separate, isolated population, she reframes the conversation by viewing Nubians as 
part of Egyptian social life as a whole, showing how “Nubian and non-Nubian Egyptians 
together co-construct ideas about Egyptianness in their everyday interactions.”52 
Like Smith’s work, this research looks at Nubians not as a discrete population, but rather 
as an integral component in shaping the identity of the Egyptian state. Smith has already laid the 
groundwork for examining the significance of Nubians as a minority, peripheral, traditional 
“other” against which mainstream Egypt has formed its identity from the Nasser period until 
today. Using critical, historicized theories on development, this research examines how the 
Egyptian government, since the sixties, has implicated Nubians in national development 
schemes. It argues that the “development” of Nubians and their land was an integral component 
in the construction of Egypt as a modern state. By looking at the continuous effect of 
development on Nubians today, this research explores the significance of this continuing 
phenomena and what it says about the interactions between the Egyptian state and its citizenry. 
Unlike many contemporary studies,
53
 which are “oriented toward assessing the degree of 
“culture and change” between Old and New Nubia, with a focus on economic change and 
agriculture,”54 this research does not ask “how have Nubians adapted to the modern world?” but 
rather “how does Egypt define ‘modernity’ through development, and how does this definition 
affect Nubians in Egypt?” 
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Chapter Summaries 
Chapter One, “Nubians, Development, and the Post-Colonial State,” explores how Egyptian 
president Gamel Abdel Nasser used development as a tool for consolidating power in the early 
years of his rule. This chapter argues that Egypt’s Nubians became citizens at a particular 
moment of modern state consolidation in Egypt, which had important implications for social 
integration. The Aswan High Dam, which would force the relocation of some 50,000 Nubians, 
was a defining symbol of Nasser’s state. This chapter highlights how Nasser conceptualized 
Egypt’s modernity based on notions of industrialization, technology, and grand development 
schemes. Development and modernization would define the climate within which Nubians 
became citizens. Using the archives of the AUC Social Research Center’s “Nubian Ethnological 
Survey,” this chapter also documents increasing state intervention into Nubian life at the time of 
the 1963-64 relocation. This intervention occurred not only through the counting, documenting, 
and recording of the Nubians, but also through the introduction of new state services. This 
chapter also looks at Nasser’s enduring, and often quite positive, legacy among the Nubians, 
offering commentary on the effectiveness of development as a tool for containing social and 
political dissent.  
Chapter Two, “International Development in Nubia,” focuses on international development 
organizations in Egypt, showing how these non-state players collaborate with national actors in 
order to achieve mutual development goals. From the 1963-64 relocation until today, 
international developers have had a continuing presence on former Nubian lands, playing a 
considerable role in dictating the Nubians’ relationship to their land. By examining the role of 
the Ford Foundation in the SRC’s “Nubian Ethnological Survey,” this chapter explores how 
developers – both national and international alike – envisioned Nubians as traditional, backwards 
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“objects” fit for development. The chapter then extends this argument to the land on which 
Nubians lived. It examines how Nubian land has become an “object” of development, justifying 
technological interventions for problems that national and international actors alike frame as 
fundamentally geographic in scope.  
Chapter Three, “Nubians: Right to Return, Right to Develop,” looks at how Nubians have 
mobilized development discourses in order to achieve an important goal: the “right to return” to 
their former homes before the 1963-64 relocation. Since the High Dam’s construction, Nubians 
have made many attempts to create new homes along the shores of the newly-formed Lake 
Nasser. The Nubians have never fully realized this feat. However, lake-side development, and 
other desert reclamation schemes on former Nubian lands, continues to occur at the hands of 
national and international developers. This chapter highlights the various areas to which Nubians 
would like to “return,” arguing that these areas represent important points of contestation in the 
debate over who has the “right to develop.
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Chapter Two: Nubians, Development, and the Post-Colonial State: 
1960-1975 
Introduction 
This chapter explores development as a tool for consolidating power in Nasser’s Egypt. Faced 
with the enormous feat of establishing a sovereign Egypt free from foreign interference, Nasser 
conceptualized Egypt’s new modernity based on notions of industrialization, technology, and 
grand development schemes, namely the Aswan Dam. This chapter argues that Nubians in Egypt 
became “Egyptian” at a very specific moment of modern state consolidation, which had 
important implications for their integration into Egyptian society. Using the AUC Social 
Research Center “Nubian Ethnological Survey” archives, this chapter documents the increasing 
government intervention into Nubian life at this time, in particular the number of welfare and 
service projects the state enacted during the 1963-64 relocation. It provides a glimpse of the 
particular context in which Nubians became Egyptian citizens. It also examines the effectiveness 
of development discourses in the consolidation of the modern state. As this chapter will show, 
many Nubians supported and continue to support Nasser during the construction of the High 
Dam, feeling that they sacrificed their old homes for the “greater Egyptian good.” Thus, this 
chapter will offer commentary on the effectiveness of development discourse as a tool for 
containing social and political dissent.  
The High Dam at Aswan: A New Era of Development 
Some forty years after his death, Gamel Abdel Nasser still commands an enduring legacy in 
Egypt. Of that legacy – controversial and diverse as it may be – the High Dam at Aswan remains 
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significant. The High Dam was Egypt’s ticket to modernity, symbolizing Egyptian 
independence, technical know-how, and a new age of industrialization and agricultural reform. 
However, while the High Dam commands so much meaning in Egypt, especially with regards to 
Nasser’s legacy, it was, in many ways, a wholly average feature of emerging modern states 
across the globe. In the 1950s, the Central African Federation built the Kariba dam, between 
what is now Zambia and Zimbabwe. Leading the Gold Coast’s transition from British occupation 
to independence, President Nkrumah built Ghana’s Volt Dam in the 1960s. In these examples, 
the symbolism of the dam for the respective countries and their leaders was just as important as 
its tangible benefits. As Thayer Scudder notes, in each of these cases, “no less a person than the 
president of the country pushed the project forward.” President Nkrumah, for instance, saw the 
Volta Dam “not just as a pilot project for the industrialization of Ghana, but as a symbol of that 
industrialization.”55 In this sense, a charismatic leader and an accompanying big dam were 
simply components of a larger formula of modernity, industrialization, and development. As 
Martha Finnemore writes, before 1968 “being “developed” meant having dams, bridges, and a 
(relatively) high GNP per capita.”56 
This was certainly a formula that Nasser employed. In an early speech about the 
impending dam, Nasser proudly declared: “in antiquity we built pyramids for the dead. Now we 
build new pyramids for living.”57 While the proposal to build the Aswan High Dam predated the 
1952 Free Officers Coup,
58
 its logic was much in line with the revolution’s goals, providing an 
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apt symbol for the newly emergent Egypt. On the level of rhetoric, the construction of the dam 
was tightly bound up with the idea of a sovereign Egypt free from foreign intervention. This is 
evident in a speech in which Nasser celebrated the laying of the first stone of the dam on 9 
January 1960. The construction of the Aswan Dam was the fruit of the labor of those who 
“warred” to “establish the independent will which they forcibly wrested from the clutches of 
tyranny, occupation, despotism, and domination.” Indeed, Nasser continued, “the greatest of all 
the values of the Dam is that it symbolizes the determination, the will and the resolution of the 
Arab people, who, having known their path, determined that they would forge ahead with dignity 
and honor, leaving no place for weakness, retreat or submission.”59  
While this rhetoric imbues the dam’s construction with a deeply charged and nationalist 
meaning, what is more interesting is the way in which the state’s potential for development 
became a measuring stick for the revolution’s success. The Dam was not only a symbol of 
“determination,” “will,” and “resolution,” it was also “a symbol of the whole Arab nation’s 
determination to carry out its self-imposed task of building up the greater liberated homeland.”60 
Nasser equated a “liberated” Egypt with a new era of “building” and development. Importantly, 
Nasser identified the land that the dam would bring into cultivation (now wrested “from the 
clutches of the desert”) as well as the “ten million K.W.H of electricity” it would produce by 
way of hydropower. This speaks to two major goals of the 1952 Revolution: land reform and 
industrialization. By “adding new arable lands, increasing the output of existing cultivated lands, 
and generating the electric power that would promote the advanced level of industrialization 
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Egypt had long striven to achieve,”61 the High Dam was an ideal symbol of progress. That 
development in both agricultural output and industry were the ways to measure this “progress” is 
important, for it prioritized these objectives in the new era of state-building.  
When Nasser spoke of “building up” the liberated homeland, he was implicitly talking 
about development. The literal term “to develop” appears only two times in this 1960 speech, 
although rather than using the term tanmiyya, Nasser adopts the similar term of tatweer. When 
describing the sacrifices Egyptians took to reach the construction of the High Dam, Nasser states 
“Today, we can take pride in the fact that we were able…to proceed in the development in our 
country.”62 In the speech’s conclusion, Nasser declares “today we face a new stage in the history 
of humanity and of the world at large …we have established a lofty principle…that the small 
powers proceed on their path and work for the development of the economy.”63 Nasser uses the 
term dawla, or state, five times, but only in reference to the Soviet Union and in general to speak 
of the resistance of “small states.” To refer to Egypt, he uses both the terms balad, or country, 
and watan, or nation six times each. Nasser used the word balad to describe “our country” or, 
when addressing the audience “your country.” Watan, in contrast, appears largely in reference to 
the “national economy.”64 Nasser uses qawmi, or national, four times, but only in reference to the 
“national economy” or “Arab nationalism.”65 
A 1968 English-language bulletin on the High Dam’s progress echoes Nasser’s 
sentiments in his 1960 address. In its introduction, then-minister of electric power and the High 
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Dam, Mohamed Sidky Soliman drew a direct link between dams, development, agriculture and 
industry, and human benefit. He writes that “the value of dams and the great part they play in the 
development of a country though water supply projects for irrigation and power is directly 
related to the growth of the population.” Calling the High Dam a “mammoth wonder of civil 
engineering,” whose design was “backed up by the most powerful scientific and engineering 
discoveries and achievements of our modern time,” Soliman placed Egypt at the forefront of 
modern innovation. The dam, Soliman writes, would “admirably meet the increasing demands 
for Egypt’s fast growing population” while also contributing to Egypt’s industrial development.66 
Across government channels, the new Egypt was to be modern, and this meant being 
industrialized, technologically advanced, and sovereign. 
Nubians Become Citizens of the New Egyptian State 
This kind of prioritization had obvious implications for the Nubians living on the land to be 
submerged by the High Dam’s artificially-created lake. Nubians, in this sense, became Egyptian 
citizens in a very specific context of development. Not only was their relocation necessary for 
the sake of Egypt’s modern development, but also they were to become active, integrated 
citizens contributing to a wider state project. The Egyptian government would use global 
knowledge and expertise to achieve modernity through development and to administer 
populations most effectively. To do this, a number of new and evolving post-Revolution 
ministries rushed to Nubia to collect a baseline of information on this formerly peripheral group. 
As they built new infrastructure, offered new services, and increasingly regulated Nubian daily 
life, these ministries brought Nubians closer into the folds of the state in entirely new ways. 
                                                          
66
 United Arab Republic High Aswan Dam Construction Authority. Materials for Final Engineering Report on the 
High Aswan Dam Project (Aswan, Egypt: Suez Canal Authority, 1968), 3. 
32 
 
In order to distinguish the Nasser period as a distinctly moment of modern state emergence in 
Egypt, it is important to outline where Nubians stood vis-à-vis the Egyptian state before this 
period. Mohamed Ali, the Ottoman leader credited as the father of Egypt’s modern state, passed 
through Nubia during an 1820-1822 expansionist expedition to Sudan. Flanked by European 
cartographers, Ali ordered for extensive gathering and documentation of the region’s zoological 
and geographic information.
67
 Before 1882, there was no official figure on the number of people 
living in Nubia. Egypt’s first census was taken in 1882, and it recorded Nubia’s population at 
45,708 people.
68
 In 1899, the border between Egypt and the Sudan was established at the twenty-
second parallel.
69
 Due to their smaller numbers, physical isolation, and distance from 
administrative centers in Cairo, Nubian communities were administratively semi-independent 
before the resettlement. There were few government activities in the region, as well as limited 
administrative supervision. The closest government administrators were stationed in Eneba, and 
could only reach Old Nubia by boat or donkey because there were no roads.
70
 “Nubia,” at this 
time, does not appear to be a cohesive unit with which the Egyptian government dealt. Rather, 
the government had relationships in different parts of the region inhabited by Nubians. For 
example, a 1902 government decree granted Nubian farmers in Adindan, a district near the 
border with Sudan, ownership of the land they cultivated, to be administrated under Muslim laws 
of inheritance. A following government decree appointed Egyptian government administrators to 
collect taxes from the area, forcing from power a group of exiled Turkish soldiers who ruled over 
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the land during the nineteenth century.
71
 In this way, some Nubians interacted with the Egyptian 
government in a spatial sense, rather than on the ethnic terms that Nasser initiated. At the turn of 
the twentieth century, Nubians identified themselves based on “regionally-based ethnic sub 
groups” and “did not regard themselves as being members of one ethnic category.”72 Nasser was 
the first person to refer to this group as the “Nubians” when discussing the relocation process 
with Egyptian media. 
73
 Apart from these individual circumstances, many of the early Nubian 
interactions with the state occurred in the context of dam building. The state provided 
compensation for the first relocations in 1902, 1912, and 1933. King Fouad offered to resettle the 
Nubians in Kom Ombo – where they were eventually relocated in 1963-1963 – but they refused 
this offer, preferring instead to move increasingly up river.
74
 Aside from monetary 
compensations, the government also carried out various irrigation projects to compensate for 
arable land in Old Nubia flooded due to the first Aswan dam. The Agricultural Census of 1950 
documents these irrigation projects and the new land they brought under cultivation.
75
 These 
projects were carried out in the early 1950s, resulting in an increase of nearly 811 feddans of 
arable land in a ten-year period; however the government halted them when they began 
considerations of the High Dam at Aswan.
76
 Of course, Nubians in Egypt were located not only 
in and below Aswan. A long-established pattern of male migration to the cities, such as Cairo 
and Alexandria, meant that Nubians had a large presence in these areas and consequently many 
interactions with the Egyptian government. Many Nubians served in the pre-Nasser governments 
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and state institutions. For example, the Nubian Major General Abdullah El-Najoumy Pasha was 
the commander of the Egyptian royal guard until Nasser’s coup in 1952, as well as a member of 
the Board of Directors of Fouad I’s Institute for Desert Research.77 
The piecemeal nature of the Nubians’ relationship to the Egyptian government necessarily 
ended when Nasser announced the High Dam’s construction and began preparations to relocate 
the 50,000 Nubians living in Egypt.
78
 Indeed, as stated above, before this moment no one had 
even used the term “Nubians” to describe this group of people. While in the past the Egyptian 
government had largely dealt with the Nubians on an individual basis, it now viewed them as a 
large and monolithic whole, an entire “problem of resettlement” that needed solving. In order to 
tackle this enormous task, a vast number of government agencies got involved in the 
resettlement, claiming a stake in aspects of Nubian life that had never before faced such 
comprehensive state regulation. While many state agencies involved in the 1963-1964 Nubian 
relocation had existed before the Nasser period, it is worth noting the sheer extent of government 
intervention in the process. Upon Nasser’s announcement of the impending High Dam project, 
the Ministry of Social Affairs assumed the responsibility of resettling Nubians. In 1960, the 
ministry conducted a survey among Nubians, focusing largely on statistical data and general 
population notes, in order to develop a relocation plan. The Committee for the Investigation of 
Nubian demands was formed in 1960 to seek input from Nubian leaders regarding resettlement 
preferences. In 1961 officials from several Egyptian ministries (spearheaded by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs) formed the Joint Committee for Nubian Migration to organize Nubian 
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resettlement.
79
 The Ministry of Land Reform was tasked with irrigating the land in the new 
settlement (with the goal of reclaiming 20,000 feddans in Kom Ombo before 1964
80
), as well as 
dividing it up among the new residents.
81
 In 1966, following the relocation process, the Ministry 
of Social Affairs handed responsibility for the New Nubia settlements and their inhabitants over 
to the Ministry of Land Reform. Shortly after, Nasser established the Egyptian Authority for the 
Utilization and Development of Reclaimed Land (EAUDRL), whose main task was to “boost 
soil fertility and productivity levels in reclaimed areas, and to provide settlers with a number of 
community services to improve social conditions and raise living standards for farmers.”82 
Other state ministries participated in the resettlement process on a smaller scale. From the 
Ministry of Interior to the Higher Sports Council, these institutions addressed every aspect of 
Nubian daily life. In 1962, the Research Institute for Animal Husbandry conducted a study in 
Old Nubia documenting the ways in which Nubians used animals.
83
 The Ministry of Public 
Transportation established a bus line in New Nubia. The Ministry of Supply took over the task of 
providing consumer goods and food materials to the new communities. The Central Agency for 
Mobilization and Statistics was one of many bodies on the national and regional level collecting 
population statistics and projections in Nubia. Over a short period of time, Nubians acquired not 
only a new communal identity of the “Nubian” but also a new relationship to an Egyptian 
government that interacted with Nubians as a unit. These institutions and their work counting, 
documenting, and absorbing the Nubians into the Egyptian citizenry is explored below.  
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The Social Research Center “Nubian Ethnological Study” and Follow-Up 
From 1961 until 1964, anthropologists from the Social Research Center at the American 
University in Cairo conducted an extensive study on Egypt’s Nubians titled the “Nubian 
Ethnological Survey” (NES). Guided by the field of “salvage anthropology,” the NES examined 
the Nubians as a bounded, remote community on the brink of extinction in modern times. The 
threat of ‘cultural extinction’ was clear: once the High Dam was constructed, forty-four Nubian 
villages would be submerged under the dam’s lake, taking with them the Nubians’ traditional 
culture and civilization. Following Nasser’s announcement to build the High Dam, the SRC 
rushed to document a culture they thought would soon be lost. 
 The 1961-1964 NES was largely anthropological in scope. It was the SRC 
anthropologists who first proposed the idea for the project, and they held considerable sway in 
determining the study’s main focuses. Those focuses included documenting and describing 
Nubian ceremonial life and religious practices, methods of water irrigation, and the role of 
women. As such, the works resulting from this study are important records of an increasing 
surveillance of Nubian lives during this formative period. While the 1961-1964 NES provides a 
rich source of material for study, this chapter focuses instead on a follow-up survey that the SRC 
conducted after the relocation, from 1971 to 1975. Unlike the 1961-64 NES, the 1971-75 “Study 
and Evaluation of the Rehabilitation Process in the Newly Settled Communities in Land 
Reclamation Areas” was more focused in scope, looking primarily at the effect of relocation on 
Nubian lives. With an emphasis on government policy in the Nubian relocation villages of Kom 
Ombo, the 1971-75 study presents a more concerted collaboration between social scientists and 
state policy-makers. While the SRC remained largely in control of the follow-up survey, it 
worked in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs, and it also produced policy-oriented 
37 
 
documents that went directly to state administrators. Thus, the SRC research represents one of 
the most significant instances of data-collection on Egypt’s Nubians before and immediately 
following the relocation period. 
In particular, this chapter looks at a two-part final report that the SRC, in collaboration with 
the EGOLCD, produced following the four years of post-relocation research. Alongside the final 
reports, this chapter examines two draft reports which, although largely similar to the polished 
final reports, were circulated internally within the Ministry of Land Reclamation (one draft was 
prepared for the EGOLR, and another for the EACDRL) and meant for state consumption. These 
documents are not only more policy-oriented than the 1961-1964 research, but also show a 
concern for mapping out the more “practical” aspects of Nubian daily life. This included, for 
example, the Nubians’ political organization, agricultural practices, and use of space in their new 
homes. The following discussion will examine these three documents in three different ways. 
First, it will look at how the 1971-75 reports speak to broader contemporary development 
literature. Second, it will examine how these reports elucidate the various anxieties facing 
modern welfare states, including issues of productivity, quantifying and managing populations, 
and national unity. Finally, the reports help in tracing a record of increasing state intervention 
into Nubian life, elaborating in particular on the number of welfare and service projects that were 
enacted during the relocation. All together, these documents reveal the specific moment of 
modern-state building – in the shadow of the High Dam – within which Nubians became 
Egyptian citizens. 
The Nubian “Rehabilitation”: Unleashing “Human Potentialities”  
38 
 
While there are many different frameworks with which one might narrate the difficult 
relocation Nubians faced as a result of the High Dam, the SRC/EGOLCD reports tell this story 
from a decidedly developmental standpoint. It begins from the very title of the report: “The 
Study and Evaluation of the Rehabilitation Process in the Newly Settled Communities in Land 
Reclamation Areas.” The word “rehabilitation” is a loaded one, implying a restoration from 
abnormal to normal and firmly grounded in development terms. The “rehabilitation process,” the 
report defines, refers to any changes that meet the goals of the “economic, social, and political 
advancement of the newly settled communities” as well as those which encourage settlers to 
“plan and execute local development projects.”84 The goal of the study, the report states, is to 
“evaluate the rehabilitation process in relation to the economic and social development.”85  
Other development jargon sprinkles the reports, including concepts such as “male 
absenteeism,” the “crime rate,” and the “crowdedness rate.” The government provides services to 
the Nubians, the reports suggest, in an effort to “raise their standard of living.”86 The reports 
articulate the planners’ concern to help Nubians maintain both “their self-identity” and their 
“self-sufficiency,” in the most time-efficient fashion.87 It calls the pattern of Nubian labor 
migration a coping mechanism for their “indigenous economic hardships” due to the Nubians’ 
agricultural lifestyle. The report notes that the Nubians’ subsequent tendency toward domestic 
service in the cities has become “an institutional pattern affecting their community structure, 
human potentialities, and values.”88 In a comparison of the agricultural resources available in 
Old Nubia versus those in the new settlement, the EACDRL report laments that “statistics and 
quantitative data [on agriculture in Old Nubia] are not abundant and where they do exist they are 
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contradictory or imprecise.”89 The absence of this data is especially significant, the report 
suggests, because “the problem of the land use is of major importance not only because it is the 
principle economic resource of that society, but also because it is deeply linked to its social 
structure and development.”90  
The reports qualify the needs of resettled Nubians in the larger picture of national 
development aims. For example, one report makes the distinction between fulfilling the “felt 
needs” of the community and ensuring “national development as a whole.” One of the “basic 
principles of community development work,” the report states, is “defining and implementing the 
‘felt needs’ of the people.” “Felt needs,” however, “must always be interpreted within the limits 
of national policy” so that they “correspond to the kinds of programs and long range goals of the 
nation.”91 The report frames government compensation for the Nubian relocation in similar 
terms. “In appreciation for the Nubians’ compliance with the national interests implied in the 
dam’s nation-wide economic benefits,” the report states, “the government committed itself to 
compensate in cash for their loss of property and in kind by establishing for them a new 
community provided with far better living facilities and public services than the Nubians had 
ever had before.”92 While the report recognizes the “traumatic experience” of relocation and the 
“multidimensional stress” it entails, it situates that trauma as a generalizable trait demonstrated in 
other “African dam resettlement schemes.”93  
The reports engage with the social sciences of their times in other ways. While the purpose of 
the study was mainly to assess the rehabilitation process, it was also concerned with the 
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“theoretical and practical implications” of Nubian resettlement. The reports were particularly 
interested in the “social change theoretical propositions for the interpretation of continuity and 
change,” and hoped to apply the data against the “recently developed predictive model” based on 
relocation adaptation experiences connected to other African dam relocation schemes.
94
 The 
reports mention that some Nubians had become over the course of years disillusioned with the 
many studies they viewed as “meaningless” and resentment began to build. At that point, the 
research team “sought information from only dependable informants” using “the ordinary 
anthropological technique of data collection.”95 
Counting, Registering, and Employing the Nubians 
In addition to describing the Nubians according to a very particular vocabulary of social 
science, these reports also feature important examples of counting, registration, and collection of 
data. “There are probably few features more characteristic of modernity than the notion that we 
can know ourselves through numbers,” Jacqueline Urla begins in her study of identity formation 
among the Basque. “Statistics, averages, and probabilities permeate our ways of talking about 
ourselves and the social world we inhabit, particularly when it comes to describing the modern 
nation-state and its citizenry: whether the subject is per capita income, industrial productivity, 
literacy rates, divorce, or military might, statistics have become a routine way of measuring the 
health and wealth of the nation.”96 As previously noted, the first Egyptian census of 1882 
recorded some 45,708 Nubians. From 1960-66, that is, before and after the relocation, Nubians 
faced a series of population counts from a number of different state bodies. According to the 
reports, in March 1960, the Ministry of Social Affairs took a population count “as part of the 
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survey of the affected land and its resources in order to provide up-to-date quantitative 
information necessary for resettlement plans.”97 In this count, the ministry documented 48,000 
people living in “Nubia.” In September of the same year, the nation-wide census was taken, 
recording some 44,108 people in Nubia. Following the resettlement, the inhabitants of New 
Nubia were counted once again, in June 1964, this time by the Aswan Center for Regional 
Planning, which tallied them at 55,395 individuals.
98
 In 1966, once again as part of the nation-
wide census, New Nubia inhabitants were counted at 58,353.
99
 The reports take interest in 
Nubia’s numerical ebbs and flows, devoting much space to contextualizing these variations in 
population size to the nation as a whole, including several breakdowns of the figures such as 
comparisons between Nubia’s three ethnic groups.100 The reports ultimately conclude that the 
population fluctuations are “transitional” and “not stable enough for population projection and 
policy making.”101 While the treatment of demography and population studies as issues of public 
policy may seem wholly unremarkable today, it is important to note that this record of Egypt’s 
Nubians matches a larger “process of institutionalizing population studies and codifying 
demographic knowledge” on global scale beginning in the 1950s. What John Sharpless calls a 
“world wide network of ‘population experts’” began, during this time, to codify “a set of 
assumptions about how population dynamics worked, how the phenomenon was to be studied, 
and, most important, the terms under which intervention was appropriate.” What emerged in the 
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institutionalization of this field of knowledge was a “consistency in methodology, analysis, and 
language” that is evident in the SRC Nubia writings.102 
The reports’ discussion on Nubia’s demography reveals an intersection between the Egyptian 
government’s compulsion to register its inhabitants, and the related desire of citizens to register 
with the state in exchange for aid and other services. As noted above, while the March 1960 
Ministry of Social Affairs census counted some 48,000 people in Nubia, only six months later 
the national census tallied this population at 44,108. This difference was largely due, the report 
notes, to “the rush of urban Nubians to the region in March 1960” so that they could register 
themselves for compensation of lost property.
103
 Similarly, the discussion of population 
breakdown between Nubia’s ethnic groups reveals how Nubians worked with state technologies 
of quantification to receive services. The report points out that the varying population sizes of the 
Nubian sub-groups have “had significant social and economic consequences.” It notes that the 
“Arabs,” who formerly made up only ten percent of the total population of Old Nubia, were 
increasingly able to influence relations in local elections and other community affairs due to their 
increasing size. The report states that each group registered to vote as many of their female 
members as possible in order “to maintain the balance of power in the new setting.”104 Thus, 
registering in local elections allowed Nubians to gain power while also reaffirming the states’ 
legitimacy to do this quantification.  
The reports reflect the modern welfare states’ concern for productivity, revealing how 
community services were explicitly offered in an attempt to increase said productivity. For 
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example, the report argues that landownership is an important right, because if tenants do not 
own their land, “it discourages the tenant from developing his land and increasing his 
production.”105 The long-standing trend of Nubian labor migration, noted above, was a clear 
point of contention for government administrators concerned with developing Upper Egypt into a 
productive force in its own right. Although government planners expected Nubian labor 
migration to cease after the relocation, the delay in land distribution and cultivation meant that 
Nubians could not settle down and profit from the new land as planners initially conceived.
106
 
While economic opportunities through farming was one strategy government officials hoped to 
use to retain the workforce necessary to develop Upper Egypt, the report also emphasizes the 
role of community services in this aim. According to the 1971 study, the introduction of services 
such as education, medical care, and youth welfare had helped “[reduce] the desire” of young 
men to leave New Nubia.
107
 The final report underlines this point more explicitly, stating that the 
government attempted to incentivize “this back-home movement” with community services that 
could provide “education facilities and/or better chances for work.”108  
In another strategy to build a male workforce in New Nubia, the Egyptian government made 
a “special arrangement” to dispense all savings and social security allowances in cash to those 
Nubians who agreed to return and work on the land.
109
 The report laments, however, that the 
majority of those who took up the offer were older men and younger children taking advantage 
of state-subsidized living before returning to the cities to work,
110
 and not the working-age, male 
target group. In order to maintain access to government services and cash subsidies, Nubians 
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would neglect to report their “absenteeism” from New Nubia to the state. However, government 
officials, according to the report, maintained hope that the looming issue of “male absenteeism” 
would decline as soon as Nubians adapted to their new setting and took up farming (although this 
apparently had not yet happened, some seven years after the resettlement).
111
 The Ministry of 
Land Reclamation was keeping a close watch on the issue of “male absenteeism,” reporting 
levels up to fifty percent in some Nubian villages at a 1970 workshop on settlement issues in 
Cairo.  
The reports also detail how Nubians were brought into state-managed land cultivation plans, 
namely in the cultivation of sugar cane. Although Nubians had not participated in wide-scale 
cultivation of sugar cane in Old Nubia, each beneficiary of reclaimed land in New Nubia was 
required to plant forty percent of that land with the crop, so long as the soil was not sandy.
112
 
This, the report states, was in order to integrate the Nubian economy into the regional sugar cane 
production.
113
 The EACDRL assumed the role of marketing sugar cane, as well as providing 
technical and administrative assistance. Compulsory sugar cane cultivation reveals how 
government ministries sought to include the Nubians as producers in the state-controlled 
agricultural projects and thus as active citizens in Egypt’s development-led modernization 
project. It also provides an interesting example of the ways in which the Nubians attempted to 
define the boundaries of their Egyptian citizenship. Nubians argued to state administrators that 
“they can make their living in a way that provides for the cultivation of land but does not require 
that the owners themselves do the job.”114 Calling the government’s agricultural policy an 
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“imposition” and an “inappropriate intervention into their personal business,”115 Nubians both 
protested state-managed agricultural policies while also acknowledging that the requirements set 
by the state had to be fulfilled (just not by their own hands). 
The Egyptian government’s anxiety about population growth also clearly informs the SRC 
studies. This reflected a contemporary global trend in population studies: as Simon Szreter notes, 
during the 1950s “an intellectual orthodoxy” solidified amongst “social scientists, economic 
planners, and political leaders in the West” who linked “national economic development” to 
population growth.
116
 The dominant theory informing this orthodoxy was that “relatively rapid 
population growth [could] obstruct the potential for economic growth in less developed 
countries.”117 The SRC reports, like other contemporary social science documents, explicitly link 
population anxieties to social and economic development goals. The final report asserts that “the 
link” between population growth rates and the realization of “social and economic goals…does 
not need stressing.” In particular, it is an increasing population that has the most potential to 
inflict damage on Egypt’s development. Referring to Egypt’s population “problem,” the report 
states that “rapid rates of population growth are a serious handicap to Egypt’s economic and 
social development.” The report adds that with improved healthcare and declining death rates, 
Egypt’s population has “increase[ed] at an unprecedented rate constituting a serious threat to all 
its development plans.
118” 
The reports pay specific attention to Nubian birth rates and fertility patterns, revealing how 
government officials incorporated Nubians into national family planning schemes. The reports 
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cite a publication titled “Population Trends in the UAR,” published by the Central Statistics 
Committee in 1969, to show the relative population growth rates in Nubia compared to the rest 
of Egypt using census date from 1882 to 1966. According to Egyptian census figures, Nubia’s 
population (it does not distinguish which Nubians are taken into account) increased by an 
average of 5.6 percent annually in the years between 1960 (pre-relocation) and 1966 (post-
relocation), compared to 2.5 percent for the rest of Egypt.
119
 The reports argue that these 
percentages are not reliable for population projections for the purpose of policy-making, noting 
that “economic and social conditions” have influenced the “post-resettlement demographic 
picture,” requiring an urgent “comprehensive demographic survey of Nubia.”120 However, the 
report notes that the government took these numbers at face value, which ultimately led it to 
believe it should “control” the “fertility pattern” in Nubia.121 In line with government policy in 
other rural areas in Upper Egypt, the government established family planning clinics alongside 
health centers in New Nubia, which offered birth control pills for free.
122
 Based on the reports, it 
appears that Nubians did not share the same population anxieties as the Egyptian government, 
refusing participation in the family planning program and preferring instead to bolster their 
numbers in the face of their new, more numerous, non-Nubian neighbors.
123
  
From Dirt Roads to Bus Stops: Expanding State Services for Nubians 
Government intervention into Nubian life by way of new services was “greater in both 
quantity and quality” than before resettlement.124 Agricultural cooperative societies, supervised 
by the EGOLCD, are one example of the new state institutions. In Old Nubia, the only 
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government services provided to farmers were irrigation projects for the cultivation of new lands, 
in order to compensate for land loss due to the old Aswan dam. New Nubia, in contrast, had 
twenty-one cooperatives that supervised the land distributed among fifty-nine percent of the 
families in Kom Ombo.
125
 While Old Nubia’s lone agricultural society merely distributed 
household supplies, the new cooperatives provided agricultural and marketing services.
126
 By 
law, all land owners in Egypt had to take part in government-supervised cooperative societies, 
which, according to the final report, served as a “liaison between the farmers and the 
administrations in regard to agricultural management and services.”127Although Nubians were 
members of each cooperative’s board of directors, they made up only 53.4 percent of the overall 
proportion of those working in the cooperative societies.
128
 Alongside the agriculture cooperative 
societies, the government set up new agricultural units consisting of a slaughter-house, a 
veterinarian and artificial insemination unit, and a unit for eliminating insects and diseases 
affecting crops.
129
 Throughout New Nubia, the government established veterinarian stations, 
with veterinarians making periodic visits from the administrative center in Nasser City. 
The Egyptian government also introduced transportation and communication services to 
the resettled villages. Comparing the services in New Nubia to those in Old Nubia, the report 
juxtaposes images of a “modern” versus “traditional” life. In New Nubia, the government built 
roads connecting the villages, a new railway line, twenty-four post offices, and new telegraph 
and telephone services. “Convenient services” were not possible in Old Nubia, where “the desert, 
and other harsh physical conditions of Old Nubia, made surface transportation available only by 
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donkeys.”130 The report celebrates the bus line established by the Ministry of Public 
Transportation as a distinctly modern achievement, “thus replacing the small boats and donkeys 
which had been used for short journeys” in Old Nubia.131   While Old Nubia has little access to 
electricity, “in New Nubia, all streets and government buildings are electrically lighted.”132  
Seemingly missing the irony in the following statement, the report details “a network of 200 
units for drinking water [which] has been installed in the new villages…in this way the 
dependence of the Nubians on the Nile as the main source of drinking water has ended.”133 The 
report similarly describes food supply and medical services as a stark contrast between 
“traditional” and “modern.” In Old Nubia, residents purchased their food from peddlers or 
merchants, often on credit, until they received cash remittances from relatives working in Cairo 
or Alexandria.
134
 In New Nubia, the Ministry of Supply established nine wholesale consumer 
cooperative societies, four household cooperative societies, and some thirty-three markets in 
order to provide consumer goods, food, and other related services such as butchers, carpenters, 
and plumbers.
135
 Despite these efforts to centralize trade, the report also documents how Nubians 
established an informal marketplace, sometimes operating out of a converted bedroom, to offer 
an alternative to the supply ministry goods.
136
 Although the Ministry of Supply provided wheat 
flour and bread for the new settlements, establishing a grain mill and seventeen merchandized 
bakeries, by the time of the SRC report thirteen bakeries had closed due to lack of business as 
Nubians preferred to bake bread in their own homes according to custom.
137
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State medical services were “very limited” in Old Nubia. In contrast, New Nubia had four 
health units, ten clinics for outpatient treatment, and a public hospital.
138
 The government kept 
official records on the “security” level in Old Nubia, and the report states that “security was well 
established,” especially when compared to Upper Egypt, where “the incidence of crime is the 
highest in the country.” However, in Old Nubia there was only one police station in the region, 
and village leaders were entrusted to resolve security matters.
139
  In New Nubia, due to the 
“maladjustment and psychological instability” resulting from resettlement, “the Ministry of 
Interior has been concerned to make security services widely available,” establishing a police 
station in Nasser City as well as four additional outposts.
140
  With that, a state police presence 
replaced a formerly autonomous system of community regulation, for in New Nubia, “security 
measures are now found to be more accessible than before.”141 In Old Nubia, children depended 
on “the village kuttub or Qur’an at the hands of the village shaykh” for their education. In New 
Nubia, Nubians could defend against the wayward instruction of local leaders by accessing 
education at nineteen government primary schools.
142
 Importantly, these new schools were 
concerned with vocational education and training in areas such as carpentry, carpet weaving, 
household management, and, for girls, in needlework and the weaving of palm trees.  The report 
describes this kind of state education as being “in keeping with the agricultural and industrial 
conditions in which they are serving,”143 further emphasizing the government’s aspirations to 
incorporate Nubians in state-led agriculture and industry initiatives.  
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While social services never reached the remote Old Nubia (there was only one social 
service agency per region), New Nubia boasted six social agencies tasked with “[taking] care of 
social welfare problems” and four additional agencies devoted to education, health, and social 
welfare.
144
 A UNICEF-sponsored program worked with those agencies to teach Nubian children 
“nursery care, cottage-craft education, and house management.”145 In order to encourage 
Nubians to participate in their own “community development,” the report states, the government 
established thirty-five community development centers supervised by social workers from 
government bodies such as the Higher Sports Council in order to sponsor youth activities, hold 
parties, and facilitate “cultural discussions.”146  
Main Insights from the SRC’s “Study and Evaluation” of Nubian Resettlement  
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that Nubians in Egypt became Egyptian citizens in a 
unique moment of modern state-building in Egypt. If the Aswan Dam and national development 
schemes were to dictate where the Nubians would live, it would also define their relationship to 
the state. As the government rushed to count and document this new citizenry of 50,000 people, 
involved ministries came to understand and quantify the Nubians in terms of “crowdedness 
rates” and “male absenteeism.” The Ministry of Land Reclamation decided where and what the 
Nubians would cultivate, tying their daily lives into the national development plans. This once 
hard-to-access group was now very easy to access, and the Nubians encountered a whole web of 
new state services and ministries with which they would regularly interact. It is important to note 
that Nubians were not the only “peripheral” group facing integration on terms of development 
during this time. Indeed, part one of the SRC report was dedicated exclusively to examining 
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resettlement schemes in the Nile Delta of semi-nomadic groups in Upper Egypt. Like such 
groups, Nubian integration occurred through the lens of development and in the shadow of the 
High Dam. 
The Power of Development: An Effective Strategy? 
If development was the imperative that drove Nubian integration in the emerging Egyptian 
modern state, how successful was that imperative in achieving integration? As Cooper shows in 
his discussion of French and British colonial rule, colonial administrators first began offering 
welfare services and new institutions in the colonies as a tactic to stave off political and social 
dissent. The same strategy applied to the post-colonial context, and the implementation of state 
services and development schemes under Nasser. The mass resettlement of over 50,000 people 
was certainly ripe for social and political dissent on a large scale. Nubians lost their homes, much 
of their personal belongings, their farmland, and their prized date palms to the High Dam. And 
yet, even during the relocation a large number of Nubians supported the Nasserist project and 
saw themselves as contributing to the greater Egyptian good. In her study of workers’ songs 
during Nasser period, Alia Mossallam argues that “the Nasserist hegemony was one the Nubians 
embraced, personalized and contributed to, rather than simply donned.”147 During her fieldwork 
with Nubians in Aswan, she found a common narrative of “unified idioms and sayings that were 
used to describe, account for, and quite often justify, their migration.”148 By examining Nubian 
songs that addressed the Dam, Mossallam reveals a strong support for Nasser’s project. In one 
ode to the Nile, Nubian singer Sidqi Ahmad Silim crooned “You have always triumphed us 
[Nubians]/ And provided a great source of life for us;/ Be the same power to Nasser as you have 
                                                          
147
 Mossallam, “Hikayat Sha’b,” 174. 
148
 Ibid., 177. 
52 
 
been to us, don’t let him down.”149 Another Sidqi song included lyrics such as “Wherever Nasser 
goes, we will go/ Before Nasser we all sat with our hands tied,/ but now that he’s here, we are all 
for him.”150  
 In this regard, one might argue that development was an exceptionally useful strategy for 
quelling social and political dissent. Nasser’s framing of the relocation as a neutral one of 
development, and the additional provision of new, modern services, was very persuasive. A 
Nubian professor at Aswan’s South Valley University, who lives in the relocated village of 
Dahmeit in New Nubia, encapsulates this idea well. He states: 
Nasser was an eloquent speaker. He visited the area in the sixties, before the High Dam 
was built, and he convinced the people that what he was doing was for the good of the 
people, for the welfare of the people. He told them: ‘you will find paradise, you will find 
everything very nice at that location.’ And people believed him. They came here, and 
found that they were away from their expectations…Of course, Nasser was a patriotic 
leader, a charismatic leader. Nubians were infatuated with him, and believed that he 
would unit Arab countries; that he would destroy Israel, all the stuff that people believed 
in…They believed that their life would be better here than it was in that area, before they 
moved. They didn’t know.151 
As this statement suggests, Nasser was a charismatic leader whose populist rhetoric created 
widespread appeal. He promised the Nubians development and a new life that would be 
“paradise” compared to the old. Nasser told Nubians that they were sacrificing for their own 
welfare and for the welfare of all Egypt. It is a testament to Nasser’s public appeal that even 
when Nubians did not find “paradise,” many still believed they were serving a greater good. 
Future Egyptian leaders would not have this advantage, and it would become increasingly clear 
for younger generations of Nubians that this “paradise” would not come from the state alone. 
“Development Refugees” and the Consequences of Development  
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In light of the resounding praise that Nasser still garners from many Nubians (although most 
certainly not all), it would appear that the Nubian development scheme was a dramatic success. 
However, in comparing the state narrative of relocation to that of the Nubians, the story appears 
more complicated. On one hand, there is a story of Nasser’s government saving Nubians from 
the desert, developing them, and providing them with modern services while celebrating their 
contribution to building an entire nation. On the other hand, there is a story of the 
“desertification” of Nubians, who, relocated to a new land away from the Nile, lost their way of 
life and embarked on years of “de-development” as a result. These underlying tensions come to 
light in small ways throughout the SRC/EGOLCD reports. 
The problems that Nubians faced in their new home of Kom Ombo are extensive and well-
documented.
152
 Throughout the 1971-975 reports, the SRC directly and indirectly brings some of 
these problems to light. The reports’ assessment of agriculture and arable land in Nubia before 
the relocation, for example, offers a taste at the kind of contradictions at hand. In Old Nubia, 
arable land was “limited to a few scattered areas in a land strip… no more than a few hundred 
meters at its widest point.”153 Nubian crops, the report states, were “subsistence” crops, the 
surplus of which was sold to merchants arriving from Aswan.
154
 However, examining these 
perceived weaknesses in Nubian agriculture before the resettlement, the report notes that the 
cause was not traditional agriculture practices and poorly manipulated land, but rather damage 
wrought by the first Aswan dam of 1902. The report states that Nubia’s limited arable land was 
due “not only to the natural aridity of the Nubian valley” but also to the land damage incurred by 
the construction of the Aswan reservoir in 1902, its initial heightening in 1912, and its second 
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heightening in 1933.
155
 While Nubians, as the report states, largely farmed “subsistence crops” 
following the construction of the first dam, the report also details how the dam’s waters 
permanently submerged large areas of Nubian date palms. The report details a transition from the 
cultivation of date palms to an increased dependence on cereal and vegetable cultivation, making 
“the Nubian agricultural economy … less diversified than it had been in the past.”156157 In this 
example, the relocation of Nubians to a new area is justified because the old area only permits 
“subsistence” farming. However, this reality contains an important caveat: Nubian agriculture 
used to be diverse, but following the government’s manipulation of the Nile that diversity was no 
longer possible. Although the SRC reports do not spell out this connection, it would seem 
relevant given the fact that a similar, but far larger diversion of the Nile for the sake of 
agriculture was soon to occur. 
Indeed, with each raising of the old Aswan dam, cultivatable area in Old Nubia drastically 
decreased (as a reminder, the dam was completed in 1902, and raised twice in 1912 and 1933). In 
1929, three years before the second heightening of the dam, there were 18,935 feddans of 
cultivated land in Old Nubia. Some 9,597 feddans were still cultivable, but were left fallow as a 
result of the Nile’s expanding waters. By 1939, after the second raising, cultivated land had 
fallen to 14,289 feddans, down by almost twenty-five percent. Fallow land increased by almost 
150 percent, to 24,026 feddans.
158
In 1939, crop acreage was forty-seven percent less than it had 
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been in 1929, despite the fact that the government had initiated irrigation projects to increase 
crop area.
159
 Government irrigation projects to compensate for this lost land brought the total 
amount of cultivated land to 15,146 feddans by 1950, and official estimates record 15,957 
feddans of arable land in the period immediately before resettlement.
160
 In sum, despite 
government efforts to recoup cultivatable land, the second raising of the dam resulted in the loss 
of roughly 3,000 feddans of arable land in Old Nubia.  
In Kom Ombo, the site of the Nubian relocation villages, the Ministry of Land Reform aimed 
to reclaim some 20,000 feddans of land for state-mandated cultivation between 1963 and 1964. If 
successful, Nubians would have 4,000 more feddans of arable land in New Nubia then were 
available before relocation. By 1966, however, only 5,863 feddans of land were suitable for 
cultivation. Because of this drastic reduction of cultivable land on which Nubians might farm 
(15,957 feddans before the relocation, down to 5,863 afterwards), the state had to carefully 
distribute the land among the Nubians. Each Nubian family received one feddan of land, which 
the government called a “subsistence feddan.” The size of these plots was sometimes half of that. 
Because it was impossible to generate an income on this amount of land, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs issued monthly cash and food allowances, “in consideration of the fact that the 
resettlement operation had placed [the Nubians] in new economic circumstances which affected 
their incomes.”161 
The “basic needs” approach to development emerged following the 1976 World Employment 
Conference, which argued that “the satisfaction of basic needs” should be the “overriding 
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objective of national and international development policy.”162 With a focus on poverty 
eradication, this approach remains a prominent developmental framework to ensure a basic level 
of human “well-being.” Although the Nubian relocation predates this theory, ideas such as the 
“subsistence feddan” speak to its fundamental premise. Egyptian government administrators 
knew that they had to provide a certain amount of land for Nubians to simply “subsist.” 
However, the administrators also knew that the “new economic circumstances” wrought by the 
relocation meant that Nubians would starve without monthly cash and food allowances. In this 
sense, High Dam development created new conditions for the Nubians that put them close to not 
even meeting their “basic needs” to survive. When discussing the concept of “basic needs,” 
Gustavo Esteva argues that the creators of this approach “explicitly recognized that development 
would not eliminate hunger and misery, and that, on the contrary, it would surely worsen the 
level of ‘absolute poverty’ of a fifth, and probably of two-fifths, of the population.”163 This might 
be a useful framework for assessing the High Dam at Aswan. There is no doubt that the Aswan 
Dam increased cultivatable land across Egypt for many farmers. However, there is also no doubt 
that the same was not true for the Nubians. After the relocation, the conditions for Nubians 
became much worse, with each family struggling to survive on a “subsistence feddan” and 
extensive state subsidies. In 1969, only 6,000 feddans had been distributed, and by the time of 
the report’s publication in 1975, 8,859 families were farming15,477 feddans of land (amounting 
to about 1.7 feddans per family).
164
 While the Egyptian government developed a formula for 
distributing reclaimed land to Nubians based on previous ownership in Old Nubia, there were 
significant delays in distribution to some families. In an Aswan Center for Regional Planning 
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Study conducted after the relocation, a new category of “destitute” families emerged to mark 
those families who owned no land in the new settlement. In that same study, the number of 
“destitute” families was as high as four times to number of families who had received land 
compensation in New Nubia.
165
 Just as development created new categories of the “developed” 
versus the “undeveloped,” so did it create new hierarchies by which to measure people along that 
scale.  
In addition, the SRC reports show that by 1971, ninety-six percent of Nubians entitled to 
housing in the first stage of resettlement (those who were living in Old Nubia at time of 
relocation) had received homes, while only two percent of urban Nubians had received housing 
in accordance with the planned second-stage of resettlement. This was due, the report states to 
“the high cost of house construction and the lack of space for additional buildings.”166 For the 
Nubians who did receive housing, the report details a “crowdedness rate” of 1.6 persons per 
room in contrast to 0.7 in Old Nubia that the 1960 census documented.
167
 The SRC final report 
would later contextualize this within the scope of other Egyptian settlements, noting that the 
Nubians rate was “low” compared to those settlements, but that the real occurrences were higher 
than figures suggested due to smaller rooms and increasing family size.
168
 By dividing families 
into housing blocks according to family size, the divorced and elderly, who had formerly lived 
with their relatives, were housed in one-room blocks that were often out of walking distance 
from their families, causing community fragmentation.
169
 Although state engineers who 
constructed the homes in New Nubia categorized them as “ideal,” the report details several 
Nubian complaints regarding housing. Not only were the homes aesthetically unsuitable for the 
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Nubians, but they also contained very serious structural concerns.
170
 For example, architectural 
defects in the house foundation and construction resulted in “severe wall or roof cracks,” 
meaning, in some cases, that homes had to be deserted. The report notes the significance of the 
High Dam’s construction in these structural failures, for the “dam engineering timetable” 
required a “rushed relocation schedule” and the necessarily “hasty construction of the new 
houses.”171 Similarly, the report notes that administrators did not sufficiently coordinate the 
housing and agricultural schemes, meaning that some villages faced flooding from water 
drainage of adjacent fields, which also formed swamps that made ideal habitats for 
mosquitoes.
172
 The SRC reports detail how the agricultural schemes themselves were quite 
flawed, with inadequate drainage systems for the new irrigation canals that were themselves 
constructed behind schedule. By the time of the report, failure to drain the canals had “led to 
deterioration of the fertility of these lands,” with some Nubians subverting the system altogether 
by filling up the canals to make space for additional crops.
173
 Although the government 
established drinking water units throughout the new villages, they lacked proper maintenance, 
creating waterlogged areas from the leakage. Sharing a power source with one of the villages, the 
water units were subject to inadequate electricity supply, meaning that the water supply was cut 
off “very often.”174 Although the government gave Nubians new sources of water in exchange 
for access to the Nile, this water source was limited and not reliable.  
In addition, the land was not ready to farm at the time of Nubian relocation, meaning it 
became a government imperative to deliver “basic food necessities for both man and animal” to 
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the new settlements.
175
 Nubians, “uncertain with the economic prospects of their new 
homeland,” left in substantial numbers during the early years to return to their former 
employment or other jobs outside the resettlement area.
176
 The final report, which conceivably 
had a wider audience among the studies’ benefactors, caveats this with a statement that labor 
migration was not as high as prior to resettlement, due to job opportunities in New Nubia and 
new industrial plantations in Aswan absorbing a “great deal of the Nubian labor force.”177 
However, this statement is not found in the draft copy reports circulated internally. 
  As mentioned above, the SRC reports note that animal care facilities in Old Nubia were 
“practically nonexistent,” with no veterinarians, animal husbandry centers, or dairies.178 Despite 
this absence, Nubians raised a significant amount of livestock, which was an important source of 
income before the resettlement (mainly sheep and goats, in addition to donkeys, camels, and 
poultry). The successful raising of livestock was possible, the reports note, because Nubian 
homes were large and animals were given ample paddock space, “an important factor 
contributing to the animals’ growth and development as well as allowing room for them to 
increase their number.”179 While the government endowed New Nubia with a whole range of 
veterinary services, within one year almost all of the 3,000 cows that made the relocation trip 
from Old Nubia had contracted diseases due to crowded conditions and acclimation to new 
territory. As a result, most of the cattle were slaughtered or sold to nearby markets.
180
 Although, 
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as detailed before, a central veterinary unit was available in the main administrative town, it was 
not easily accessible for people in the more distant villages.
181
 
The irony of Nubians being relocated for the sake of development, only to find their lives in 
many ways less developed, is hardly unique. In his study of the Kariba dam, and its forced 
displacement of some 57,000 Tonga people in the 1950s, Thayer Scudder uses the term 
“development refugees” to describe the Tonga community. Writing in 1993, Scudder stated of 
the Tonga: “Today, most are still ‘development refugees.’ Many live in less-productive, 
problem-prone areas, some of which have been so seriously degraded within the last generation 
that they resemble lands on the edge of the Sahara Desert.”182 The Egyptian government justified 
the relocation of the Nubians partially on the basis that the lands they used to occupy were barren 
desert wastelands. As the comparison of arable land in the hands of Nubians before and after the 
relocation shows, the new land they received was not very different from the old, and 
conceivably even much worse. This much is clear in the SRC report, which states that Old Nubia 
was “an arid, rainless region in which agriculture depended entirely on Nile water,”183 whereas 
New Nubia’s “hot, dry climate… does not differ much from that of Old Nubia. New Nubia lies 
in an arid, rainless zone and depends for irrigation upon water transported from the Nile.”184 The 
Egyptian government, in saving Nubians from the “desert,” essentially relocated them to a desert 
even further away from the Nile. 
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The Nubian retelling of the relocation today also defies the image of a new period of 
prosperity ushered in by resettlement. One Nubian living in Aswan told me of an elderly woman 
who experienced the relocation and now lives in the resettlement villages of Kom Ombo some 
sixty kilometers north of Aswan. This woman, he said, has traveled by boat or road to Aswan at 
least four times a week since the relocation, ostensibly to sell goods and make a living but also to 
be near the water, which she cannot access from her new home.
185
 While the promise of new 
economic opportunities and improved quality of life was the basis of the government’s narrative, 
many Nubians to this day have yet to see such promises fulfilled. A 2010 petition by the 
Egyptian Center for Housing Rights, for example, laments “the lack of development projects that 
Nubians can benefit from,” which has led to “poor economic conditions for them.”186 In a 2013 
documentary titled “Erki,” a young Nubian born in Cairo travels to Aswan to visit his ancestors’ 
home. When in Kom Ombo, the Nubian resettlement village, the narrator interjects to say that 
Nubians refer to this area as the “Valley of the Devil,” or the “Valley of the Dead.”187 Describing 
the relocation, he states “we experienced ‘desertification’ on a large scale. I can’t even describe 
it – people who used to live on the Nile, now in the desert.”188 During a 2014 visit to Aswan, 
many Nubians repeated to me this idea of banishment to the desert. “When Nasser moved the 
Nubians,” one Nubian told me, “he moved them to the desert, made villages far away from the 
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water….they used to live by the water, green, and they went to the desert instead.”189 “Nubians 
suffered a lot,” another Nubian living in the resettlement villages told me. “The place which you 
see now was not like this when they came. There were a lot of scorpions, a lot of snakes. Insects 
everywhere. They suffered a lot. Being away from the Nile, [there were] a lot of deaths in the 
first year.”190 This small glimpse of Nubian life after relocation highlights the discord between 
the government’s narrative on resettlement and that of the Nubians. 
Conclusion 
The High Dam at Aswan carries a lot of meaning in Egyptian history. It was a means to develop 
the country by increasing industrial and agricultural output. However, as Nasser’s speeches 
show, the High Dam was about a lot more than development. The dam also became the very 
symbol of Egypt’s sovereignty; a sovereignty that Nasser based on notions of modernity and 
technological prowess. Its construction marked a defining moment for a newly-reconstituting 
nation that had witnessed decades of external control. Likewise, when 50,000 Nubians became 
Egyptian citizens, a developmental framework guided their integration into Egyptian society. 
The Egyptian government assumed the total welfare of the Nubians, and it deployed a multitude 
of state activities and services into the relocation process. This brought Nubians closer to the 
Egyptian state than ever before. The government expected the Nubians to contribute the national 
development goals as well. In the shadow of the High Dam, these development goals carried a 
certain urgency and anti-intervention flavor that was unique to this formative period. However, 
like the High Dam, there was a more complicated story behind the state’s development of the 
Nubians. Development for Nubians was not simply a process of taking one way of life and 
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making it “better.” Rather, there were larger issues at stake. The mass relocation of 50,000 
people from their historic homes without their consent or consultation lays bare the social and 
political dispossession that Nubians faced under the Nasser regime. The discourse of 
development helped to cover these issues bubbling under the surface for the benefit of the 
“greater good.” Many Nubians accepted the relocation as a sacrifice they were making for the 
nation. Far fewer Nubians would say that the state’s “development” made their lives “better” 
than before. The state narrative argued that Egypt’s government was rescuing Nubians from the 
desert and giving them a direct ticket to modernity through new facilities and services. Nubians, 
in contrast, argue that they faced widespread “desertification” as a community and embarked on 
years of “de-development” as a result. These conflicting narratives reveal an important tension in 
the history of development for Nubians. Nubians suffered the most directly due to the High 
Dam’s construction, while the rest of Egypt received the most benefits from this development. 
The High Dam may have contributed to Egypt’s development, but it had the opposite effect for 
many Nubians. For Nubians, development during Nasser’s period created the conditions that 
made them no longer capable of assuring that their “basic needs” were met without government 
assistance.
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Chapter Three: International Development in Nubia 
Introduction 
Although the Aswan High Dam was a symbol of national development and sovereignty, Egypt 
was not the only country with a stake in the project. As soon as Nasser announced plans to build 
the High Dam, a number of international actors rushed to the scene in order to participate in 
some aspect of this transformative moment in history. The historical artifacts in the former 
Nubian lands were a major focal point of these interventions. In 1960, for example, the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) launched an 
“International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia.” The thirty-year campaign resulted in 
hundreds of excavations of historical sites, as well as the impressive relocation of several 
temples above the new water levels wrought by the dam. 
International intervention in Nubia was not limited to cultural preservation. Others took 
interest in the resettlement and “rehabilitation” process of the Nubians, hoping to extract from it 
generalizable theories that might be applied to resettlement across the world. Some focused on 
developing former Nubians lands. This chapter focuses on international development efforts in 
Egypt’s southern and western desert, showing how non-state players collaborate with national 
actors in order to achieve mutual development goals. First, this chapter examines the role of the 
Ford Foundation in the SRC’s “Nubian Ethnological Survey” to understand how developers – 
both national and international alike – envisioned Nubians as traditional, backwards “objects” fit 
for development. This chapter then looks at how developers applied the same logic to Nubian 
lands, justifying interventions that continue to this day. By introducing one contemporary 
example of development on former Nubian lands, the Toshka Project, this chapter highlights 
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how international developers hold a continuing presence on former Nubian lands, playing a 
considerable role in dictating the Nubians’ relationship to their land. 
The Ford Foundation: Removing Nubians from the “Path of Progress” 
As the Egyptian government made plans to resettle the Nubians, it also launched a wave of 
studies and documentation campaigns in order to learn more about this once-distant group of 
people. Chapter Two examined the documents resulting from one such campaign, the “Nubian 
Ethnological Survey” (NES), which the Social Research Center at the American University in 
Cairo carried out in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation. 
Although the NES was loosely affiliated with various government ministries, its participants and 
funding was largely external. Backing the project financially was the Ford Foundation, an 
America-based non-profit organization founded in the mid-twentieth century. The Foundation 
provides an exemplary case of international development organizations involved in the Nubian 
relocation and development scheme. With its globally-oriented outreach and emphasis on data-
production, the Foundation’s participation in the Nubian relocation was hardly unique. This 
section provides a historical context for the Foundation’s work, emphasizing the larger global 
policy trends that subjected Nubians to additional development goals. In addition, this section 
examines inter-office memorandum between Ford Foundation staff to identify some of the issues 
at stake for the organization and their implications for Egypt’s Nubians. 
 Edsel Ford, the son of Ford Motor Company founder Henry Ford, established the Ford 
Foundation in 1936 with the broad aim “to administer funds for scientific, educational, and 
charitable purposes” and serve “the public welfare.”191 Following a 1949 restructuring of the 
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Foundation’s operations, these broad aims became more specific, and more globally-oriented. In 
lieu of “the public welfare,” the Foundation’s new focus was “to advance human welfare.” The 
Foundation defined “human welfare” through a list of essential conditions. This included: 
“human dignity” (“a belief in the inherent worth of the individual”), “personal and political 
freedom and rights,” and “social responsibility and duty of service” (“that every person 
recognize a moral obligation to use his capabilities…to contribute positively to the welfare of 
society”). Closely related to the Foundation’s concept of human welfare was the “ideals of 
democratic peoples.” The reformulated Ford Foundation of 1949 stated that “while our ultimate 
concern is with the individual, it is clear that only in society can his full development take place. 
Modern man cannot forsake society in search of freedom; freedom, for him, exists only within 
and by means of the social order.” Thus, the Foundation’s new mandate emphasized its role in 
building the “complex modern world large-scale and complicated arrangements…necessary to 
provide the social and economic conditions under which freedom can be assured.”192 
 The Foundation’s particular definitions of human welfare and democracy, in addition to 
its visions for the ideal society, helped shape multitudes of Foundation-supported activities 
throughout the non-Western world. While the Ford Foundation is not explicitly a development 
organization, it clearly has a stake in international development, as the 1949 mandate makes 
clear with its emphasis on the “full development” of modern man and his society. The Ford 
Foundation was not the only American non-profit acting towards these global development aims; 
other prominent actors included the older Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations. These private 
foundations did not act in isolation from one another, but rather collaborated on shared 
development goals. These organizations helped develop a global consensus around leading social 
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theories on issues such as a population control and economic growth.
193
 The social theories that 
organizations such as the Ford Foundation helped codify allowed for “radical shifts in 
development policy” after World War II.194 As Sharpless states, “the philanthropic subsidy of 
demographic research in the immediate postwar years was not simply an exercise in pure science 
but was specifically aimed at policy.”195 Foundations such as Ford thus helped institutionalize 
new spheres of knowledge from which governments could develop policies on broad range of 
issues. They also helped define what those issues were. As Timothy Mitchell notes, the Ford 
Foundation played an instrumental role in the formation of the market-practices of the nineteenth 
century, “[transforming] economics into a global form of knowledge” by which every country in 
the world could be “measured and understood.”196  
The Ford Foundation’s involvement in the Nubian relocation provides a glimpse of the 
policy issues with which the Foundation was most concerned during its early years. In 
cooperation with the AUC Social Research Center and the Egyptian government, the Ford 
Foundation funded the 1961-1964 Nubian Ethnological Survey, as well as the post-resettlement 
surveys from 1971-1975. The foundation paid $100,000 for the initial NES survey, and another 
$65,000 for the dissemination of information and training of anthropologists, including graduate 
fellowships for three Egyptians to attend American universities.
197
 Although the SRC was 
interested in the study for its potential benefits to anthropological theory and practice, the Ford 
Foundation approached the project from a more practical, policy-oriented angle. AUC 
anthropologists developed the project concept, and they were the ones who brought it to John 
Hilliard, the Ford Foundation’s representative in Cairo at the time. Hilliard passed the idea along 
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to F.C. “Champ” Ward, the program director for the Near East and North Africa, arguing that the 
project would contribute to a better understanding of social development in Egypt.
198
 The 
Foundation approved the SRC’s original proposal and authorized a supplementary grant to fund 
the SRC’s follow-up study after resettlement. In 1974, Harvey Hall, a program associate at the 
Foundation in New York, completed a “terminal review and evaluation” of the SRC Nubia 
program. A series of intra-office correspondences, in which Foundation employees discuss the 
SRC Nubia project and its final report, offers insight into how the organization looked at Egypt’s 
development. The correspondences also illuminate on where the Nubians themselves stood – or 
did not stand – in the Foundation’s vision for an ideal Egyptian policy. 
A recurrent theme in the 1974 Ford Foundation correspondences is the question of 
expertise. As Timothy Mitchell explains in Rule of Experts, the twentieth-century politics of 
national development and economic growth was “a politics of techno-science, which claimed to 
bring the expertise of modern engineering, technology, and social science to improve the defects 
of nature, to transform peasant agriculture, to repair the ills of society, and to fix the 
economy.”199 This politics was constituted through a proliferation of new fields of social 
sciences, arranging the chaos of nature through the rationality of modern expertise. As concepts 
such as “the society” and “the economy” became increasingly discrete, professionals staked out 
new niches of specialized knowledges in areas such as statistics, economics, public health, 
peasant studies, and criminal justice. This was certainly a trend that the Ford Foundation 
encouraged. Of their many regrets regarding the NES, the lack of diverse experts in areas other 
than anthropology was near the top. According to employee Terry Prothro, the overarching 
problem with the study was simply that there were not enough experts involved. A problem of 
                                                          
198
 Ibid., 19. 
199
 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 15. 
69 
 
this scope, Prothro suggested, required a “multi-disciplinary approach.” Were the Foundation to 
do it over again, they might have included “someone from policy sciences (development 
administration, maybe?), an agricultural economist, an ecologist and maybe someone from the 
new field of “ekistics” (the generalized version of city planning).” In addition, Prothro suggests, 
a “qualified Egyptian social worker” and perhaps an additional “political anthropologist” would 
have rounded out the cultural anthropologist-heavy research team. Throughout the 
memorandums, other Foundation employees support this claim, noting especially their regret that 
anthropologists devised the project and presented it to the Foundation and not the other way 
around.  
In the Foundation letters, there is also an emphasis that social science research, such as 
that conducted by SRC anthropologists, must be practical and have a tangible outcome. In 
Harvey Hall’s assessment of the SRC projects, he asserts that “the Foundation’s predominant 
concern with the applied aspect of research was emphasized from the start.”200 In a letter 
between Foundation employees Courtney Nelson and Robert Edwards, Nelson champions the 
project as a “neat model of Foundation efforts to enlist social research to serve development.”201 
Citing Champ Ward, she mentions the study’s “limited generality” as a major flaw.202 If the 
Nubians’ experience with resettlement could not be extrapolated into larger policy plans 
regarding development, then it was of limited use. Indeed, as Nelson prescribes later, the 
Foundation faced an important and urgent task of “codify[ing] what we have learned from the 
many attempts we have made to relate the social sciences to the development process.”203 Champ 
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Ward, writing to John Hilliard, was concerned from the project’s onset that the research was 
most useful “in terms of social sciences experience for those taking part in it” rather than “in 
terms of general utility for a developing country.” He expressed concern that the “general 
settlement problem in Egypt” would not be “illuminated” by this research on a “rather special 
group in a rather special set of circumstances.” He wondered if the “lessons to be learned” from 
this small group were really “capable of generalization.”204 In this sense, the employees assess 
the project as a missed opportunity to influence policy. Harvey Hall, for his part, seems to chalk 
up this misstep to “the restrictive definition of overseas development that the Foundation 
subscribed to at that time.” By that “restrictive” definition of development, the Foundation 
accepted the SRC’s insistence that “a much more complete understanding of the Nubian people 
and their culture was necessary” in order to “successfully” carry out their resettlement. Thus, 
Hall argued that resettlement might have gone more smoothly if policy planners ignored Nubian 
cultural and social particularities and instead followed a generalizable framework derived from 
past experiences of mass resettlement.  
For F.F. Hill, the Vice President for Overseas Development, applying research findings to 
policy decisions and operations was of primary concern. He was less interested, he wrote in a 
letter to Ward, in “coordinating committees consisting of everyone and his brother who might 
have some conceivable interest in the proposed Nubian research project and its application.”205 
Instead, he wanted assurances that all involved parties would get the resulting findings into the 
hands “and heads” of the state decision-makers.206 The Foundation correspondences repeatedly 
express doubt that the study held sway in this regard. Framing the issue with a diplomatic flair, 
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Hall remarks that “it is difficult to assess what impact the Nubian research had on the plans for 
resettlement at Kom Ombo.”207 Nelson, responding to the question “Was it [the project] worth 
doing?” was able to muster a “yes” because of the publications resulting from the research and 
the training of three Egyptian Ph.Ds. However, she makes the similarly ambiguous statement that 
“it is less clear that the project had a greatly beneficial impact on the Nubians or on the behavior 
of government officials.”208 From Cairo in January 1962, Frank Sutton remarked that there were 
good “personal links” between the SRC and the Ministry of Social Affairs, however “he did not 
have the impression that there was a strong and continuing influence directing the AUC 
researchers toward supplying data that might be needed for practical planning of the Nubian 
resettlement.”209 
This Foundation exchange provides a glimpse of the newly codifying fields of expertise 
building modern nations at this time. From the correspondences, however, it is clear that the 
Foundation viewed Egypt, and the Nubians in particular, as anything but modern. If linear 
concepts of development, such as those proposed by the modernization theory, were losing steam 
in the 1970s among social scientists, they still appear well-rooted in the offices of the Ford 
Foundation. As the modernization theory suggests, fundamental value changes are necessary for 
a society to become “developed.” This appears to be the Foundation’s assumption regarding 
Egypt’s Nubians. Nelson asserts that the Nubians, with “few elementary school products among 
their numbers,” posed serious communication issues with the highly-educated researchers, 
arising from fundamental “differences of world view.”210 Indeed, the lack of education among 
Nubians was a perfect illustration, she writes, of the “kinds of obstacles we need to overcome to 
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integrate the social sciences into developing societies.” In contrast to those “developing” 
societies, projects such as the SRC NES, if conducted in the “developed world,” would involve 
“a greater community of interest and experience among the actors involved than was the case in 
the Nubian resettlement.” If only the Nubians were more developed, the correspondences 
suggest, and better read in the “terminological” language of social sciences, they might have 
been “better able to articulate [their] needs and preferences.”211 
The theme of Nubians as a primitive, backwards “object” of development is a recurrent 
one throughout the Foundation’s inter-office memorandums. One of the main obstacles holding 
back the study’s success, Nelson writes, was simply the “practical difficulty of resettling this 
rather primitive tribal group into new surroundings.”212 Later, in her letter to Robert Edwards, 
she mentions Champ Ward, who “expressed doubt about the value of helping to maintain the 
integrity of a rather minor traditional culture as opposed to speeding their integration into a 
larger policy.”213Maybe, Prothro suggests, the reason this “problem” was defined as an 
“ethnographic one” (and not a “problem of resettlement call[ing] for… an interdisciplinary 
team”) was because “interesting African tribes were involved.”214 That the “traditional” Nubians 
were eager for development on Western terms also appears self-evident. Besides the uncertainty 
he had with the generalizability of the project, Ward’s second major “qualm” was, in his 
rendering, a “rather metaphysical question” of whether  
The integrity of traditional groups and their cultures must, at all costs, be sustained, or 
whether they should not go off and seek their fortunes in an age when traditional cultures 
are breaking up everywhere, rather than suffer the special ministrations of Western social 
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scientists and solicitous governments. I seem to remember that we were told that a 
previous group had dispersed, and I keep wondering whether this is deplorable or simply 
enterprising on its part
215
 
In this rendition of the SRC project, Ward posits that the researchers and government officials 
were so accommodating to Nubian “culture” that it was even, perhaps, to the Nubians own 
detriment. Why force the Nubians to stay traditional for the benefit of Western academics and 
“solicitous governments,” when all they wanted was to be “enterprising” and seek monetary 
fortunes?  
Nelson, for her part, accepts that Nubian wishes for the resettlement process might be 
more complex than Ward suggests. Summarizing the various parties’ stakes in the project, 
Nelson imagines that the “Nubians, presumably, had both short and long run concerns.216”  She 
suggests that the Nubians “presumably wished to get beyond the inevitable resettlement with as 
little change in their way of life as was necessary.” However, she is much more certain about 
what the Egyptian government and the SRC researchers hoped to gain in the experience. In 
Nelson’s recounting, the government’s main goal was “to remove the Nubian population from 
the path of progress with the minimum necessary fuss and expense.” The social scientists, in 
turn, wanted to record a traditional culture before it “vanish[ed].”217 While Nelson has a less 
narrow view of Nubian preferences, it is her “presumptions” about Nubians that form the basis of 
those preferences. She later writes that Nubians “probably” had few people educated beyond 
elementary school.
218
 Given the earlier contention that Nubians were inefficiently equipped to 
articulate their own “needs and preferences,” it would appear that the Foundation employees did 
not go out of their way to figure out exactly what those “needs and preferences” were.  
                                                          
215
 Hall, “Terminal Review” 
216
 Ibid. 
217
 Nelson, “Ford Foundation Inter-Office Memorandum to Mr. Robert H. Edwards.” 
218
 Ibid. 
74 
 
As the previous paragraphs suggest, the Ford Foundation was deeply concerned with 
building a relationship with the Egyptian government, which the employees cite as one of the 
foremost goals of the project. In an attempt to indicate success in this regard, the letters mention 
a conversation between Hilliard and Sayed Marei, the then-Central Minister of Agriculure and 
Agrarian Reform, who expressed an early interest in the project. The letters suggest that, like the 
Foundation, Marei saw the project as an opportunity to theorize on land reclamation and 
resettlement, using social science to quantify large-scale economic and social change. According 
to Hilliard’s account, Marei supported the project because “world experience” in land 
reclamation and resettlement indicated that “the greatest single cause of failure” was the 
“inadequate consideration of the human element.” In Hilliard’s words, Marei called the project 
“a pilot effort to test and demonstrate the application of social science techniques to the problem 
of social and economic change on a large scale.”  
Whether or not Marei expressed those sentiments in those words is unknown – Nicolas 
Hopkins, in his chronicle of the SRC project, suggests that Hilliard may have exaggerated 
Marei’s claims as a government official in order to bolster the Foundation’s interest in the 
project.
219
 However, the choice to include Marei in these letters emphasizes how international 
actors such as the Ford Foundation do not act in isolation, but actively work to complement state 
projects on the national level. In the letters, a few instances of direct quotations from Marei 
indicate that Egyptian government actors shared in the Foundation’s rhetoric regarding the 
project. According to Hilliard, Marei, for example, “was no more interested than the Foundation 
in ‘dropping these people back into the same rut where they have lived for centuries.’” However, 
he was also concerned about ascertaining the “limits of tolerance” of social change within which 
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resettlement might contribute to progress but beyond which social and economic disintegration 
might take place.
220
 According to Hilliard, Marei underlined his concern for social and economic 
disintegration “by noting that rioting was already going on in Sudanese Nubia over the issue of 
dispossession.”221 
This exchange brings to light several important elements about the relationship between 
international development organizations, the states with which they partner, and the “objects” of 
their development. Like the Ford Foundation, Marei was keen to describe Egypt’s Nubians as a 
“traditional” group that had not changed “in centuries.” Both the Foundation and Marei imply 
that if they do not intervene with development measures, Nubians will continue along in their 
same “rut,” to the great detriment of the group. But Marei’s comments also tease out an 
important tension underlying these conversations that neither the Foundation nor the government 
explicitly address. That, of course, is the implicit social and political risks at hand with a project 
as traumatic as relocating 50,000 people from their homes. As Hall notes in his terminal review, 
SRC researcher Robert Fernea was “fully alive” to the risks of being a foreigner offering input 
“on an internal matter that was in danger of becoming politically sensitive” due to rising costs of 
resettlement and lack of follow-through on early government promises.
222
 As Marei and the 
Foundation dance around these underlying issues, they couch them in broader social science 
terms – such as their concern for “considering the human element” – that obscure the larger 
political issues at stake.  
 Although these exchanges are simple memos between Foundation employees working in 
and with the New York offices, they speak to larger issues with regards to international 
                                                          
220
 Hall, “Terminal Review.”  
221
 Ibid. 
222
 Ibid. 
76 
 
development agendas and the Nubians. For one, the Foundation’s clear overall target is to 
influence Egyptian policy-makers. Although the project they funded directly concerned the 
Nubians, the Nubians are almost an after-thought in the Foundation’s discussions. Clearly, 
building connections and new avenues of influence with national policymakers was central to the 
Foundation’s global vision for “advancing human welfare.” However, the Foundation employees 
do not merely disregard the Nubians in the correspondences; they also frame them as backwards, 
un-educated, and unable to “articulate their preferences” concerning their relocation. This 
provides an apt justification for intervention on both the national and international level. By 
presenting the Nubians as ripe “objects” for development, the Foundation not only validates their 
involvement in the relocation but also sees itself as one of the forces improving life for the 
Nubians. However, the Foundation measures such improvement on its own terms. For the 
Foundation employees, they cannot conceive of any goals for the Nubians other than to become 
“modern” and rich. It is important to note that Egyptian government actors shared many of the 
Foundations sentiments, which this chapter explores below. The Foundation’s work was less 
about coercing the Egyptian government on policy issues than encouraging consensus about 
what they believed to be the most effective social theories for governance.  
 These assumptions had important implications for Egypt’s Nubians. When the 
Foundation envisioned for the Nubians a linear path to development, along which they might 
amass fortunes and become modern according to Western measurements, they helped disallow 
“peoples of different culture…the opportunity to define the forms of their social life.”223 For the 
Ford Foundation to label the Nubians as ripe for development “require[d] first the perception of 
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themselves as underdeveloped, with the whole burden of connotations that this carries.”224 Both 
national and international actors told – and continue to tell – Nubians that they are 
underdeveloped, and Nubians continue to fight that label to this day. Comparing the 
Foundation’s description of the Nubians against the Nubians description of themselves during 
this time provides two different stories. Take, for example, the question of education among the 
Nubians. Nelson asserts in her writings that the Nubians “probably” had few among them 
educated past primary school, calling the Nubians a “rather primitive tribal group.” Nubians 
themselves, however, recount this history differently. According to one Nubian scholar living in 
the resettlement villages of Kom Ombo, 
When Nubians came to this village, most of them were educated. They established schools: 
prep schools, primary schools, and so on. They came with their educated teachers, and the 
Nubians were more educated than the villagers they found here. The non-Nubian villagers in 
this area had to study in our schools. They had no schools at all. Therefore they [the Nubians] 
did not only teach in their schools, but also in the schools of non-Nubians. This is an 
established fact from the beginning.
225
 
As Foundation employees speculated on the Nubians’ education level from their offices in New 
York, Nubians who relocated during the 1963-64 move presented an entirely different 
conception of the Nubian community. While the Foundation saw the Nubians as un-educated and 
“rather primitive” during the time of relocation, Nubians recall that they were so educated that 
even non-Nubians traveled to attend the schools established in their new homes. While the 
Foundation argued that due to the Nubians’ low education levels, they were not sufficiently able 
to “articulate their preferences” for resettlement, Nubians might recall instead Soleiman Ageeb, a 
Nubian lawyer from the 1940s and 1950s who was part of Egypt’s Wafd Party. According to the 
Egyptian-Nubian Lawyers Association in Cairo, Ageeb was a skilled lawyer who demanded and 
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received an office for handling Nubian issues in King Farouk’s administration.226 This example 
shows the large disconnect between an international development organization and the group of 
people upon which they implemented their projects. Nubians, as subject to both national and 
international development agendas, had little voice in these agendas that dictated their lives. 
Saving the ‘Comely Maidens’ of Nubia 
The Ford Foundation correspondences underscore the many justifications that development 
actors gave for acting on Nubians as an “object” for development. Nubians, according to these 
justifications, were traditional, backwards, uneducated, and wholly incapable of breaking the 
“rut” of a thousands-year long culture on their own. Developing the Nubians, according to the 
Ford Foundation, was the only way to wrest them from their traditionality and introduce them to 
the modern world. It is important to emphasize that international developers were not alone in 
engaging in this sort of rhetoric about the Nubians. As the Ford Foundation correspondences 
show, the Foundation was, above all else, interested in building ties with Egyptian government 
officials. By funding the SRC research, the Foundation was thinking about the bigger picture: 
integrating this government into their global vision of “human welfare.” As this section 
demonstrates, the Foundation conception of the Nubians as a traditional object for development 
closely mirrored the Egyptian government’s own narratives of the Nubians and their history. A 
1960 book Nubia, which the Ministry of Culture published after Nasser’s announcement to build 
the High Dam, evidences that the state’s official narrative was not very different from the 
Foundation’s. 
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In 1960 the Egyptian Ministry of Culture sent a delegation of artists to Nubia in order to 
“capture” and portray the land and its people before the High Dam’s flood. Published in the same 
year, the resulting work from this trip featured of photographs, sketches, and historical text on 
the Nubians. The ministry released three translations of Nubia, in French, English, and Arabic, 
and copies of the book are still found in many Egyptian libraries, suggesting it was widely 
disseminated. One of the most pervasive assertions in Nubia is that Egypt’s Nubians had not 
changed or evolved since Pharonic times. Throughout, the book claims that Nubians represent a 
distant ancestor to modern-day Egyptians, frozen and unchanging since ancient times. The book 
opens with preface by Sarwat Okasha, the then-Minister of Culture and Natural Guidance, who 
poses a tribute to the “everlasting sanctuaries of quiet distant Nubia.” “Established as they are by 
destiny,” Okasha writes, “we should have preferred to keep them intact as witnesses of a 
longsince vanished world, but human needs have made it imperative to construct a dam that will 
preserve the land of the Nile.” From the very opening sentence of the book, Okasha lays out a 
number of dichotomies classifying the Nubians versus other Egyptians. While Nubia is a vestige, 
a “vanished world” that is worth keeping only as a reminder of the past, it could not last in the 
face of a modern Egypt and its tangible “human needs.” The High Dam is a “vital necessity” and 
the answer to “a demographic, social and economic problem” that subsumes any other claims to 
preserving Nubians culture. However, while Nubia must be regrettably tossed away, “we cannot 
allow a whole country to disappear without seeking to discover what remains for us to learn of 
our distant ancestors.” Although Nubia is not regarded as composing demographic, social, or 
economic human needs, it does provide a useful reminder of ancient Egypt. 
That is not to say that at some point, Nubians were not at the forefront of innovation. 
Indeed, the “earliest inhabitants of Nubia” (those who emerged during the upper Paleolithic time) 
80 
 
possessed all of the “fundamental elements of civilization”: agriculture, domesticated animals, 
and sedentary living. Based on monuments and skeletons dating to this period, the book suggests 
“Nubians then enjoyed the same degree of civilization as the contemporary Egyptians,” and were 
of the same race. The book cites additional archeological studies to show that the early 
inhabitants of Nubian (i.e. “at least since 5000 BC”) “possessed the same level of culture as the 
pre-historic Nubians.
227” However, Nubia explains that Nubians were ultimately unable to keep 
pace with Egypt’s 3000-year modernization process. Indeed, “whereas Egyptian civilization 
made rapid progress as from 3200 B.C., that of the Nubians remained at the level it had attained 
in predynastic times.”228 Once Egypt was united by Menes, a “splendid Pharaonic civilization” 
rose in the North. However, “contrary to what would be expected from their constant contact 
with the rising and progressive culture of their northern compatriots, the Nubians remained 
primitive and backward.”229  
According to Nubia, the disparity between Nubians and the rest of Egyptians had only 
grown over time. Indeed, the Nubians of the 1900s were essentially unchanged from their 
“primitive and backwards” ancestors of 3200 BC. Nubians, “make pottery vessels in the same 
way as did their prehistoric and pharaonic ancestors.”230 Although the Nubians “are very 
peaceful, honest, and good-tempered folk,” they “still observe many of their ancient customs.”231 
According to the Ministry of Culture, it is Nubian women in particular who preserve Nubian 
traditionality. “They dress their hair,” the book explains, “especially the women, in precisely the 
same fashion as the ancient Egyptians.”232 A captioned photo in the book reads: “Here is a 
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comely maiden of Nubia, whose hair is braided and falls on her shoulders in the exactly the same 
fashion as the hair of the lovely musician of Amenhotep II.”233 While the men have sought work 
outside of Nubia, “it is the clever women of Nubia who carry on practicing the old industries 
which they have inherited from their forebearers.”234  Their cooking vessels, baskets, beds, hair 
combs and hair pins, throwing sticks, shepherds crooks and other daily items, have “analogies in 
Ancient Egypt,” down to the form, decoration, materials and method of making.235 In summary, 
“the Nubians are, of all the people of modern Egypt, those who bear the closest resemblance to 
the Ancient Egyptians.”236 With the relocation of the Nubians to new homes and environments, 
“with them will disappear a unique chance to study and record at first hand the last living vestige 
of the glorious civilization of Ancient Egypt.”237  
Clearly, the Ford Foundation was not the only actor justifying the “development” of 
Nubians based on their allegedly traditional, if not endearing, culture and lifestyle. By depicting 
the Nubians as relics of an ancient past, works such as the culture ministry’s Nubia argued that 
Nubians could not modernize on their own. By highlighting geography as the most significant 
determinant of Nubian “backwardness,” Nubia justified technological intervention into these 
lands. It is important to note that Nubians were hardly the only group facing this rhetoric in 
Egypt. Pervasive narratives on Egypt’s peasantry throughout modern Egyptian history cast this 
group as a similarly unchanging mass facing the rude awakening of modernity. Numerous actors 
from both inside and outside Egypt helped shape this narrative. As Samah Selim’s 2004 work 
The Novel and the Rural Imaginary in Egypt, 1880-1985 shows, Egypt’s “peripheral” rural 
population was a subject of great interest to urban Egyptian writers. Timothy Mitchell uses the 
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example of Richard Critchfield’s 1978 work Shahhat: An Egyptian to show how “scholarly 
imaginings of the post-colonial peasant” both borrowed from and contributed to the solidification 
of Egypt’s fellah as the homogenous and backwards “masses” of Egypt.238 Shahhat’s 
introduction for example, argued that Egypt’s peasant had “never changed their way of life” in 
more than 6,000 years. The book significantly claims to represent “people found in the rural 
Third World today.”239 Shahhat’s claim speaks to the pervasiveness of this narrative and its 
seemingly universal applicability across social groups and national borders. As Mitchell argues, 
this depiction did not emerge out of some inherent truth about the peasantry but rather out of 
evolving “political processes” regarding rural unrest.240 It certainly found a home among both 
national and international actors with regards to the Nubians and was undoubtedly influential in 
shaping the Nubians as a fair “object” of development.  
“Shut in Between River and Desert”: Environmental Justifications for Development on 
Nubians and their Land 
While the first part of this chapter focused on the Nubians as an “object” of development, this 
section turns the focus to former Nubians lands as “object.” It highlights how the framing of 
Nubian land as a dry, barren desert, untouched by modernity not only justified development on 
that land, but also on the Nubians who needed to be “rescued” from it. Like the Nubians, the land 
that Nubians once called home remains the object of national and international development to 
this day.  
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 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is just one of many development 
actors who have maintained a continuing presence in former Nubian lands since the 1963-1964 
relocation. Following the High Dam’s completion, from 1971 to 1975, the UNDP in conjunction 
with the EGOLCD carried out a project for the “Integrated Development and Settlement of New 
Lands Irrigated by the High Dam Waters.” The project’s main objective was to help the Egyptian 
government establish “economically viable and socially integrated communities.”241 Some 
twenty years later, in 1997, the UNDP and GOE formulated a “Strategic Plan for the 
Development of Human Settlements in New Valley, South of Egypt.” Collaborating with the 
Ministry of Planning (MOP), the UNDP produced a “Comprehensive Development Plan for 
Aswan and Lake Nasser” in 2002/3, which included “economic and social planning for spatial 
development.”242 More recently, in 2002, The UNDP and General Organization for Physical 
Planning (GOPP) launched the “Strategic Development Plan of Southern Valley (New Egypt),” 
which is still active today and is estimated to end in 2017. The project focuses on institution 
building, and aims to “[strengthen] local administrations and [build] capacities in planning for 
sustainable human settlements, especially in strategic planning and community-based 
planning.”243  
 These projects, which span across a period of forty years, share a familiar combination of 
elements. All call broadly for social and economic development. All target the creation of 
“sustainable human settlements” as their goal. The current Southern Valley project describes its 
vision for sustainable development in general terms: a “program to change the process of 
                                                          
241
 Tadros, Final Report Part One,” 1. 
242
 Ibid., 9. 
243
 “Strategic Development Plan of Southern Egypt (New Valley).” United Nations Development Programme Egypt. 
Last modified 2012. 
http://www.eg.undp.org/content/egypt/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/StrategicPlanSouthernE
gyptNewValley.html 
84 
 
economic development so that it ensures a basic quality of life for the people, and protects the 
ecosystems and community systems that make life possible and worthwhile.”244 What is unclear, 
however, is how exactly these projects differ. The UNDP office in Cairo does not have much of 
an answer to this question. According to the UNDP’s Egypt media representative, documents 
from earlier UNDP projects in Nubia did not make the move when the national office changed 
locations last year. The representative had never heard of the projects from the 1970s – indeed, 
they were “so old” that she had not even been born yet. Even the 2003 project was too dated; the 
representative did not think there was anyone in the current staff who had worked at the UNDP’s 
Egypt office for that long. When pressed for any additional information about UNDP projects in 
Aswan, she mentioned that the UNDP may have an upcoming project “in Nubia” that is still in 
the very preliminary stages.
245
 
 The material available on UNDP projects in former Nubian lands leaves an impression of 
vagueness and redundancy. They are vague in that there are forty years of projects which all 
target sustainable economic and social development as their goal. They are redundant in that 
none of these seemingly persistent problems have yet been resolved over a period of half a 
century. The fact that the current UNDP staff members may know little, if anything, of past 
projects their offices conducted on the same land they work on today poses serious questions 
about the cumulative effects of such work.  
Gustavo Esteva, writing in the 1990s, called the new development ethos emerging in that 
decade as one of “redevelopment,” that is, “to develop again what was maldeveloped or is now 
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obsolete.”246 The UNDP Egypt office is certainly not the only international development 
organization that might fit this bill when it comes to development in former Nubian lands. 
Indeed, virtually every international development report on the area – from the 1960s until today 
– reads almost exactly the same. In the introduction of the SRC’s 1975 “Study and Evaluation 
Report,” for example, SRC researcher Helmy Tadros presents the problem as: “intimately 
connected with the economy of Egypt is its population problem. Rapid rates of population 
growth are a serious handicap to Egypt’s economic and social development.” Continuing on, 
Tadros adds: “in considering the agricultural resources in relation to this serious population 
explosion, we find that cultivated area is limited despite all efforts to increase it,” resulting in a 
“low standard of living” for the peasant.247 
This particular combination of demography and geography as the “problem” causing 
Egypt’s woes, which Tadros demonstrates in 1971, is a recurrent refrain in Egyptian 
development reports today. Compare, for example, the UNDP’s current Southern Valley project. 
A 2005 project budget features a list of “problems to be addressed” containing all the usual 
suspects. Rapid population growth, limited effectiveness of government interventions, weak 
local administrations: all of these are “the major impediments for sustainable human settlements 
development in Egypt.”248 Cities are overcrowded, with forty-three percent of the population 
living in concentrated urban areas, and agricultural areas cannot support rural populations 
“where fertility rates are higher” than in the urban settings.249 Although these two reports discuss 
projects on former Nubian lands, one might easily swap them with a past or present development 
scheme in Egypt. The image of Egypt as a dry, desert landscape overfilling with a rapidly 
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expanding population is a recurrent refrain in development texts on Egypt. As Timothy Mitchell 
shows in his critical read of these texts, the analysis of Egypt on such naturalized terms reduces 
the country to a one-dimensional “object” for development. By describing Egypt’s “problem” as 
one of simply geography, its limits become nothing more than “nature, physical space and 
human reproduction.”250 In presenting Egypt’s limit as one of geography and demography, 
Mitchell argues, the reports obscure what is truly at stake: “powerlessness and social inequality,” 
requiring not technological and managerial solutions, but social and political ones.
251
 In lieu of 
fundamental social and political reforms, these texts propose new technologies to counter what is 
framed as an issue of traditionality and lack of modernity. Because this system “cannot change 
itself,” it requires intervention to join the twentieth century.252 While Egypt’s Nubians were 
hardly the sole recipients of this discourse, their experience brings to light some of the 
consequences this language carries for the “objects” of development.  
This analysis speaks to the work of Frederick Cooper and others, who show how colonial 
regimes used development as a means to quell social and political dissent in the last years of 
colonial rule. The environmentalism argument worked well for colonial administrators in this 
regard. By conceptualizing the colonies on naturalized terms, they became a fit “object” for 
intervention. In his study of the development initiative during the imperial crisis of the 1940s, 
Coopers finds “a striking feature of imperial discourse at the most senior levels: the Africa 
France and Britain sought to develop was not the complex, varied, changing social field African 
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historians have now shown it to be, but a flat, unchanging, primitive landscape. Development 
was something to be done to and for Africa, not with it.”253  
As Chapter two demonstrates, Nasser’s post-colonial regime relied on similar tactics, 
using development and technological mega-projects such as the Aswan High Dam to constitute a 
new Egypt. Much like the former colonial powers, Nasser’s government used geographical 
determinism to justify such interventions. Recall, for example, Nasser’s 1960 speech celebrating 
the start of construction on the High Dam. The dam, Nasser suggested, would help Egypt capture 
its arable land from the “clutches of the desert.” According to Nasser, Egypt’s struggle for 
sovereignty and social justice began with a battle against its own landscape. This determinism 
was not limited to the land on which Nubians lived, however, but also on the Nubians 
themselves. The image of Nubians as a traditional people bound by their limited geographic 
resources and unchanged since antiquity was a dominant narrative during the time of the 
relocation. As the SRC “Survey and Evaluation” repeatedly suggests, the Egyptian government 
intervened with development to Nubian lands and Nubian people in order to modernize a place 
and people that could not modernize on their own. Geography as a determinant for intervention 
is a rampant line of thought in the 1960 Ministry of Culture book Nubia. As the following 
analysis of Nubia will show, the argument for intervention in Nubia on geographical terms 
shared many similarities with the justifications to develop the Nubians themselves. By arguing 
that geography was the primary determinant of Nubian daily life for centuries, and by asserting 
that this geography could only be “saved” through modern intervention, development actors 
created an inextricable link between the Nubians and their land, justifying them both as fit 
“objects” for development. 
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  In no unclear terms, Nubia suggests that the “harsh desert” geography of Old Nubia was 
responsible for forming the culture and character of Egypt’s Nubians. Throughout the book, the 
geography of Old Nubia is a major determinant of all aspects of Nubian life, even his “manners 
and customs.” Indeed, “the Nubian who abandons his native soil always hopes to return to it, so 
he preserves his manners and customs in the country to which he has emigrated.” These manners 
and customs, cultivated alongside the desert geography of Nubia, include “fidelity, directness, 
and precise habits,” as well as “his cleanliness, simplicity, his love for saving, his feeling for 
group solidarity, and his attachment to his family.” Living in a “region of limited production,” 
has largely dictated the terms of Nubians existence, Nubia implies. Like their early ancestors, 
Nubia writes, “the Nubians have struggled and are still struggling to stay alive in this arid 
setting.” Not only are the contemporary struggles Nubians face merely geographic, and mirror 
the struggles Nubians faced in 3000 BCE, “their lives have become yet harder as the result of the 
changes brought about in their country since the beginning of the century.” Although Nubia must 
change in order to address “Egypt’s own growing needs,” the process of change will also, “in the 
end…ensure the welfare of the Nubians themselves.” With an economy centered on agriculture, 
Nubians have sought work in big cities “in order to support the families who remain, shut in 
between river and desert, in the ancestral village.” 
In fact, Nubia suggests that environment and geography are the direct causes of Nubia’s 
so-called decline. “The inhabitants of Nubia could not follow up their cultural evolution at the 
same tempos as those of Egypt,” Nubia states, because “the Nubian inhabited only narrow strips 
of fertile land on both banks of the Nile shut in by desert to east and west, an arid waste that had 
nothing to attract the valley dwellers.” As the population expanded, the book describes, it 
migrated northwards to Egypt or southwards to the Sudan, a process “that itself cut off the 
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country from the current of civilization.
254” The Egyptians, in comparison, “having once 
established themselves in the valley as a result of the new climatic conditions” (i.e. “the 
dessication that came at the end of the Stone Age”), “began the struggle against the dangers of 
the Nile inundation and began to use the river water as a public utility in the best common 
interest by digging canals and constructing dikes.”255 Thus, Nubia, by allowing itself to be ruled 
by nature, did not progress, whereas the Egyptians, with their fearless manipulation of their 
surroundings, modernized rapidly. Not only that, Egypt progressed faster than Nubia “by 
imposing order and a disciplined obedience upon all,” enabling it to “go forward in the direction 
of progress and civilization.”256 With that, the book suggests that the Nubians, like their 
environment, were undisciplined and thus fit “objects” for development. 
In reading this widely-disseminated Ministry of Culture book,
257
 it is no wonder that 
many Egyptians may have seen developmental intervention in Nubia and to Nubians as entirely 
justified. According to the ministry, Nubians were unchanged since antiquity because of their 
harsh geographic settings, and only technology could set them on pace to modernize. Just as 
Egypt had beat back the tides of the desert with dikes and canals, so too might Nubia and 
Nubians finally join the modern world. Nubian land, the vast, isolated desert that it is, was a fair 
“object” for development. And because Nubian existence is inextricably formed by that 
geography, the Nubians were fair game as well. The Ford Foundation certainly agreed with this 
logic: as previously shown, the Nubians were repeatedly labeled primitive and tribal, stuck “in a 
rut that they had existed in for centuries” and could not break on their own. A certain 
environmental determinism was also present in the Foundation logic for intervention; Harvey 
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Hall, for example, described Nubians as “a long-established culture, well adapted over the 
centuries to a harsh and confining environment.”258  
The Toshka Project: Releasing Egypt from the Desert’s “Captivity”   
Of course, these documents are products of their time, and one would be hard-pressed to find any 
development organization, international or not, using such charged labels as “primitive” or 
“backwards” for its target of development. However, by justifying contemporary intervention in 
former Nubian lands on the basis of geography and demography (external of decades of social 
and political change), development actors today market the same image, with all of its 
connotations. Take, for example, the Toshka land reclamation project, which the Egyptian 
government inaugurated in 1997 as part of a larger South Valley Development Project aiming to 
reclaim 3.4 million feddans of land over a twenty-year period that was once at least partially 
inhabited by Nubians. The crowning initiative of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the Toshka 
project aims to create a “parallel civilization” to the Nile by pumping excess water from Lake 
Nasser to adjacent land to the west. At the center of this scheme is the Toshka Depression 
(wadi), a naturally-occurring depression in Egypt’s western desert. Since 1978, the Toshka 
Depression had served as an overflow location for excess water in Lake Nasser. A fourteen-mile 
long canal initiated under Nasser’s rule channeled this excess water from the western shore of 
Lake Nasser to Toshka. In 1997, Mubarak’s government decided to turn Toshka from a mere 
water dumping ground into a forcible agricultural source in its own right. To do that, the 
Mubarak government enacted a spillway and pump construction project (1997-2005) that would 
not just guide excess water from Lake Nasser to Toshka but actively pump water from the 
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Lake.
259
 The goals of the Toshka project were two-fold: to reclaim land from Egypt’s western 
desert, and to relocate twenty percent of Egypt’s population in order to free up the Nile.260 
Although Toshka is a government initiative, it has received support from many 
international development bodies. In 1998, for example, the Business Studies and Analysis 
Center of the American Chamber of Commerce, commissioned a report (funded by USAID) 
celebrating the project, which was still in its nascent stage. The report begins in typical fashion. 
“Seeking to relieve population congestion in the Nile Valley,” the introduction leads, Egypt’s 
government has enacted a broad scheme to reclaim desert land. Egypt, according to the report, 
has “failed to keep pace with an alarming population explosion” over the past century.261 The 
“congestion” caused by Egypt’s population density, it adds, is “frustrating development efforts.” 
In addition, the population rate will cause “insurmountable pressure on the available arable land 
resources,” and the “disproportionate growth of population and cultivable land since the early 
19
th
 century indicates a potential crisis of considerable magnitude.”262 Due to this “impeding 
crisis,” the GOE has had to act to increase inhabitable and cultivable land.  
 The American Chamber of Commerce report calls Toshka, in addition to broader 
government plans to increase cultivatable land from eight million to 11.4 million feddans by 
2017, an “urgent and necessary condition for development.” With “a huge L.E. 300 billion 
investment requirements, this project is the government’s most ambitious development initiative 
yet,” the report states. Calling for “flexible coordination” between the government, the private 
sector, and Arab and international funding agencies, the report suggests such policy coordination 
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“is crucial to effectively attain the social and economic objectives of the project and assure its 
sustainability.” The American Chamber of Commerce is not the only development organization 
to place a resounding stamp of approval on the Toshka mega-project. Some seven years later, the 
2005 Egyptian Human Development Report (which the UNDP in Egypt and the Ministry of 
Planning and Local Development issue jointly) would also proclaim that “Toshka is an example 
of the desired model that combines Egyptian, Arab, and foreign direct investment in 
agriculture.”263 
The ACCE report perfectly encapsulates the sluggish development and re-development of 
Nubian land over the past one hundred years. The report celebrates the Egyptian governments’ 
initiative to stave off over-population and food scarcity by reclaiming desert land in former 
Nubian areas. However, it makes no references to the exact same campaign that Nasser enacted, 
with a debatable degree of success, in the 1960s. As this research has shown, fears of 
overpopulation and food scarcity were central to the Nasser administration’s framing of desert 
development, and the dialogue around the Toshka project shows little evolution in this 
conversation besides the introduction of bigger and higher-risk mega-projects. 
Indeed, the similarities between the Aswan High Dam and the Toshka project are 
striking. From Abu Simbel, the pinnacle of heritage rescue efforts during the construction of the 
High Dam, Hosni Mubarak gave a speech announcing the launch of the South Valley 
Development Project on January 9, 1997. “This is an epoch-making day,” Mubarak began, “a 
day that will usher Egypt into a new era. It is time for Egypt to be released from captivity within 
the narrow valley to stretch out into the vast expanse of its entire territory, in pursuit of a better 
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tomorrow, gleaming with hope for all Egyptians.” Just as Nasser used the High Dam as a symbol 
of a “new era” in Egypt, so too did Mubarak envision the Toshka project as Egypt’s next chapter; 
“a super-project of construction, which represents the proper point of entry into the Twenty-First 
Century.” Like Nasser, Mubarak simplified the challenges facing Egypt to one of mere 
geography, a “narrow valley” that prevents Egypt from expanding to its full potential. Nasser 
said that the High Dam would help “wrest” land from the “clutches of the desert.” Mubarak 
described a “narrow valley” holding Egypt in “captivity.” By following an “integrated plan of 
intensive and all-out development covering agriculture, industry, mining, and tourism,” Mubarak 
suggested, Egypt would finally be “self-sufficient” in food production. Egyptians would have the 
chance to “move out of the contested valley that could no longer accommodate high population 
density.” Like Nasser, Mubarak used science and expertise to lend the project credibility. “We 
have never been in a hurry [to begin],” Mubarak announces, “as it was science and fact that had 
the final say in this project.” “Bygone is the time when projects are selected or completed for 
political considerations, regardless of the viewpoint of specialized experts, economic assessment, 
or scientific feasibility study of such projects,” he concluded. The South Valley Project, Mubarak 
suggested, was about raising the entire Egyptian nation to global standards of modernity. “We 
give absolute priority to the interest of the homeland, above all else, in serving the supreme 
national goals,” Mubarak decreed, and “we are facing variables of a new world, which require 
constant work so as to keep pace with human progress.”264 
The similarities between the High Dam and Toshka do not end at the shared language 
that Nasser and Mubarak used to describe these projects. As Reem Saad notes in her study of the 
1997 “tenancy crisis,” “it is perhaps ironic that at the same time that the government was widely 
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publicizing the new mega agricultural and water projects (Toshka, South of the Valley, and East 
Eweinat, for example), large numbers of rural dwellers were experiencing their first year of 
landlessness after losing access to land they have farmed securely for decades.”265 Just as the 
Egyptian government under Mubarak was enacting sweeping land reform with enormous social 
implications for Egypt’s most vulnerable members of society – the very people that Toshka and 
South Valley claimed to address – it was championing developmental mega-projects as the 
solution to all of Egypt’s decidedly geographic, and hardly political, woes. Toshka was “a quick 
fix for all of these social problems, lack of food security, joblessness,” and it is not insignificant 
that the young generation targeted for this project would become the centerpiece of the 2011 
Revolution that overthrew Mubarak’s rule.266 In 2012, a mayor from Abu Simbel reaffirmed this 
idea, telling The National “the answer to our problems is not in big projects…It's about simple 
things like changing the law in our governorate to open more land for affordable housing. It's 
about investment that leads to jobs.” 
International development bodies employed the same language that the Egyptian 
government used to describe this project and its potential for success. Over five decades, these 
two actors have continually reformulated the same tale of a vast and conquerable desert that, 
with the help of modern achievements, can be transformed to magically eliminate Egypt’s  
population “problem” and food and land scarcity. Rather than producing focused political reform 
that could address very tangible problems such as landlessness wrought by new tenancy laws, 
these actors propose instead high risk, multi-billion dollar projects to address these broad issues. 
Toshka certainly failed in that regard, which is evident in the fact that projects like the UNDP’s 
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Southern Valley continue to address issues such as “overpopulation” and “food scarcity” to this 
day. It is the icing on the cake that Toshka also became a symbol of corruption and 
mismanagement during Mubarak’s rule. Despite its populist rhetoric, Toshka is a private 
investment scheme; the main landowner, Egypt and Kingdom Holding Company, is controlled 
by Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal. Talal bought 100,000 feddans of Toshka land in 1998 at 
prices well under the market value (some 300 million US dollars in total), and following the 
2011 Revolution, he agreed to relinquish control of 75,000 feddans.
267
 Talal brought in 
California-based Sun World to help cultivate the land; producing cotton, watermelons, grapes, 
citrus, strawberries, and tomatoes that, although consuming vast amounts of Egyptian water, are 
sold strictly for export to Europe.
268
 Lack of transparency is also a major issue with Toshka. 
“Part of the confusion surrounding the [Toshka] project,” one researcher wrote in 2001, “relates 
to the lack of detailed plans for all aspects of development and implementation.”269 In addition, 
the lofty land reclamation goals have been nowhere near met; one researcher estimated that by 
2010, anywhere from 1,000 to 16,500 feddans had actually been irrigated in Toshka. This is a 
violation of Egyptian law that requires cultivation of desert land within a limited period from 
purchase.
270
 In 2005, the government cancelled the second phase of the project because so many 
conditions of the first phase remained unmet. 
Despite the public criticism of Toshka, encouraging development through costly mega-
projects does not appear to be a concept that is going away anytime soon. As newly-elected 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s political program suggests, desert development may very well become the 
                                                          
267
 Abdel Latif Wahba and Mariam Fam, “Egypt, Kingdom Holding Sign Deal on Disputed Toshka Land,” The 
Daily Star, The Daily Star (Lebanon), 8 June 2011. 
268
 Warner, Flood Planning: The Politics of Water Security, 46. 
269
 Ibid., 43. 
270
 Andre Fecteau, “On Toshka New Valley’s Mega-Failure,” Egypt Independent, Al-Masry Al-Youm, 26 April 
2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/toshka-new-valleys-mega-failure.  
96 
 
cornerstone of a “new” Egyptian era. In an early August speech announcing plans for the 
construction of a second lane to the Suez Canal, Sisi emphasized that he also intended to finish 
the Toshka project.
271
 Interviews with government employees in Aswan suggested that there are 
still many people on board with the idea, on the condition that one day it finally be implemented 
“correctly,” as one MOALR employee clarified.272 When discussing potential land reclamation 
projects for the Aswan area, an official for the Lake Nasser Development Authority (LNDA) had 
many ideas for new ventures in the region: new governorates, some forty-five new settlements 
around Lake Nasser, tourism and development. But the LNDA official emphasized that he was 
“not talking about the present, but about the future, with the new President.” For now, he said, 
“we have plans but we don’t have the implementation.”273  
Conclusion  
During the 1963-64 relocation, Nubians were subject not only to national development agendas 
but to international ones as well. Starting in the mid-twentieth century, new spheres of social 
science emerged to address all aspects of state administration. With organizations such as the 
Ford Foundation working to codify social theories that might be applied across the globe, an 
increasingly homogenous idea of development began to emerge. These theories, with their 
emphasis on issues such as population control and free-market economics, found a home with 
national governments looking for a manual to modernity. As national development goals merged 
with evolving international theories on development, the space for alternatives concepts of 
development decreased. As the SRC involvement in the Nubian relocation shows, the line 
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between local and international actors in Egypt could be blurry at times. The SRC Nubian 
Ethnological Survey worked in collaboration with the Egyptian government and included 
Egyptian researchers, and it also received its funding from an international development 
organization. The SRC writings on Nubia reflect the dominant anthropological paradigms of the 
time, and its framing of the Nubian relocation on developmental terms was hardly unique. The 
Ford Foundation’s interest in the Nubian resettlement scheme shows how these social scientists 
wished to synthesize mass relocation experiences across the globe into generalizable theories. 
The Ford Foundation of the mid-twentieth century assumed that all “undeveloped” people 
wished for development, and that they could measure this development through indicators such 
as demography or economic production. Development actors at this time did not necessarily take 
into account that Nubians could have different indicators and priorities. What’s more, the people 
writing development’s rules saw the Nubians and other “objects” of development as backwards, 
traditional, and unable to guide themselves to the twenty-first century.   
This argument also extended to Nubian land. As development theories evolved, they tried 
to become less exclusionary of the recipients of development. Concepts such as “participatory 
development,” whereby development occurs with the collaboration of those it seeks to develop, 
are widely held in the field of development studies today. The discussion of development on 
former Nubian lands, however, is largely consistent from the Nasser period to this day. 
Development texts about Egypt’s desert continue to pose Egypt’s growing population as an 
urgent crisis for which there is only a technical solution. These technical solutions manifest as 
mega-development projects, such as the example of Mubarak’s Toshka. In the absence of 
concurrent social and political reform, these projects do little but exacerbate Egypt’s existing 
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problems. The very point of these projects is to avoid facing the real changes that need to be 
made; much like is shown in the examples from the colonial period. 
The examples of the colonial period also remind us of how truly violent this discourse 
can be. As the example of Palestine shows, displaying technological superiority over land can be 
used to justify assuming sovereignty of it. In the case of Palestine, Zionism justified the 
establishment of the state of Israel based on the contention that they were the most capable of 
developing historic Palestinian lands. By arguing that the country was “a virtually uninhabited 
desert – a land without a people for a people without a land,”274 Zionists presented themselves as 
the natural inheritors of that space. Development actors in Egypt viewed former Nubian lands 
through a similar lens. They argued that Nubians were incapable of developing the land and thus 
outside intervention was required. Nubians, in the process, lost decision-making control over 
their former homeland. By arguing there was “nothing there” when the state arrived, this 
narrative erases the memory of the Nubian schools, date trees, and homes that existed before
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Chapter Four Nubians: Right to Return, Right to Develop 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have shown Nubians and their land as the “objects” of development, 
whether at the hands of the Egyptian state or in the eyes of international development 
organizations. It should go without saying, however, that Nubians and their land are not one-
dimensional abstractions. Many Nubians, since the beginning of the 1963-64 relocation, felt that 
they were making an enormous sacrifice for the benefit of the nation. As such, they saw 
development as a right, rather than a side-effect of relocation. They were not passive recipients 
of development; rather, they used this language to advocate claims from the same state that was 
imposing development on them. This chapter looks at how Nubians appropriate development 
discourses to achieve a number of different aims. In particular, it explores how Nubians have 
mobilized development discourses in order to achieve an important goal: the right to return to 
their former homes before the 1963-64 relocation. 
 Since the High Dam’s construction, Nubians have made many attempts to create new 
homes along the shores of the newly-formed Lake Nasser. Nubians have never fully realized this 
demand. However, lake-side development, and other desert reclamation schemes on former 
Nubain lands, continues to occur at the hands of national and international developers. Thus, the 
battle over “right to return” is also a battle over the “right to develop.” This chapter highlights 
the various areas to which Nubians would like to return, arguing that they represent important 
points of contestation in the debate over who has the “right to develop.” 
Nubian Development Organizations: Some Examples 
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National and international development actors do not have a monopoly on development 
discourses in Egypt. Since the 1963-1964 resettlement, Nubians have formed a number of 
different organizations in Egypt and abroad. From the general Nubian clubs in Cairo and 
Alexandria, to professional organizations, to charitable societies, Nubians are active in a broad 
range of activities that address both Nubian solidarity and issues facing Egyptian society in 
general. One of those issues is development. The Egyptian Nubian Development Foundation, for 
example, located in Cairo’s Sayeda Zeinab, is a 2013 addition to a long tradition of Nubian-led 
development initiatives. Led by Mosaad Herki, a former president of the general Nubian club in 
Cairo,
275
 the Foundation has a close relationship to power in the Nubian Community. The 
organization, which holds nightly classes, focuses on a broad range of issues associated with 
development. Among its targets are human rights, consumer protection, organization and 
administration, economic development, and the environment.
276
 
With such a broad range of activities, The Egyptian Nubian Development Foundation 
seems to use “development” as an umbrella term for about everything. Access to resources and 
power defines this brand of development. The organization’s opening ceremony in 2006 featured 
some of the leading Nubian institutional leaders, including representatives from the Sudanese 
Embassy in Cairo, leaders of the Sudanese community in Egypt, Egyptian Nubian leaders, the 
assistant director of Cairo security, the head of the Central Agency for Reconstruction, and 
more.
277
 While the organization is ostensibly about development, it has a clear policy agenda as 
well. In his statements at the Foundation’s opening ceremony, Herki positioned Nubians as the 
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best situated to “heal any cracks” between Egypt and Sudan. He discussed security issues and 
challenged allegations of Nubian separatism, emphasizing the importance of relations between 
“Nubia” and Sudan.278 Herki, in his capacity as president, comments regularly on a wide variety 
of issues in the Egyptian and international press. Egypt’s economic development is a common 
talking-point for him, and Herki often highlights how Nubian development efforts can play an 
integral role in shaping Egypt’s economy. To the Kuwaiti weekly The World Today, for 
example, Herki boldly declared that Egypt has the potential to become one of the world’s 
“economic tigers.”279 The Egyptian Nubian Foundation for Development seems to be more aptly 
described as a personality cult formed around Herki, who is featured in basically everything they 
post on social media. Other skeptical Nubians have told me as much, suggesting that once Herki 
relinquished his leadership position in the General Nubian Club, he simply created a new body to 
lead. In light of the organization’s ties to power and considerable political leverage, it is, in many 
ways, a wholly average institution for development.  
The Egyptian Nubian Development Foundation is not the only Nubian organization 
focused on development. In 1993, following a joint meeting between the Nubia clubs of Cairo 
and Alexandria, Nubians established the Nubian Company for Development and Investment.
280
 
Many other Nubian groups today also push social and economic development as part of their 
broader aims. The Nubian Knights group on Facebook, for example, was established in July 
2012 by “Nubian youth, who have many social and development goals.”281 The group provides 
digital archives of Nubian memory, contemporary newspaper articles, and different materials 
                                                          
278
 Ibid. 
279
 “Mosaad Herki: Egypt Can Become One of the World’s ‘Economic Tigers’,” The World Today. The World 
Today Weekly.  
280
 Roman Poeschke, Nubians in Egypt and Sudan: Constraints and Coping Strategies, (Saarbrücken: Verlag Für 
Entwicklungspolitik Saarbrücken, 1996), 151. 
281
 “About.” Nubian Knights Community Organization. Facebook Page. 
https://www.facebook.com/nubianknightsteam/info  
102 
 
related to Nubian political demands and often advocating Nubian-led development. A recent 
series they published called “know your rights, ya Noby,” for example, listed information about 
Egyptian and international laws regarding the protection of minorities, the promotion of cultural 
identity, insurance of non-discrimination, anti-racism, and the ability to preserve language. Like 
the Egyptian Nubian Development Foundation’s definition of “development,” groups such as 
Nubian Knights use the term loosely. Unlike the Egyptian Nubian Development Foundation, the 
Nubian Knights are composed of younger, politically vocal Nubians with fewer connections to 
the Egyptian state and fewer resources. No matter how they define “development,” however, it is 
important to emphasize that many different Nubians engage with this concept and employ it for 
various aims. 
Nubians and the Return to Lake Nasser 
Nubian calls for development also play an important role in their quest to return to their home in 
Old Nubia. Almost immediately since the 1963-1964 relocation, Nubians have pressed the 
government for the ability to resettle on the newly-formed banks of Lake Nasser. In 1977, 
Nubian writer Khalil Shefa published an article titled “The Return,” which argued that Nubian 
resettlement on the banks of Lake Nasser was a “logistical move and inevitable development.” 
Although the Nubians tried to cope with the “relocation crisis,” Shefa wrote, “existing living 
conditions in Kom Ombo are not likely to improve…returning to Old Nubia should become the 
reality, because living in New Nubia in the hope that things might get better is no more than a 
mirage.”282 Already at this moment, Nubians saw that they were not living in adequate 
conditions for development and thus felt they a right to lay claims elsewhere. 
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The call to return to Old Nubia continues to this day. The Egyptian Center for Housing 
Rights, in a 2010 statement to the UN, declared that since the 1963 migration “Nubians still 
struggle for their right to return to the closest point to their original lands around Nasser 
Lake.”283 In a list describing the “special demands” for Nubians that the state must 
“unconditionally” accept, the Nubian Democratic Youth Union includes at the top “recognizing 
the right of the Nubians to return to their original homeland, and their right to have priority of the 
reclaimed land around Lake Nasser where there are currently new villages, as well as in the 
desert areas of Aswan.”284 
When Nubians talk about the “right to return” to Lake Nasser, they mean, in general, the 
relocation of Nubian villages to their former relative locations along the Nile. If a former village 
was on the west bank of the Nile, 450 kilometers from the border, for example, members of that 
village would relocate to that same vicinity, taking into account that the Nile’s waters have 
expanded in places due to the dam. This, of course, is a huge endeavor: the Egyptian government 
relocated forty-four Nubian villages during the 1963-64 relocation, and several more during the 
preceding three relocations. For this reason, Nubians also articulate specific points for relocation 
that they view as logistically feasible for resettlement and crucial to Nubian history. While this 
list varies from group to group, there are several main overlaps. In general, Nubians cite Wadi 
Karkar (the new government-built relocation site for uncompensated Nubians), Abu Simbel 
(home to the famous temples), Fourqandi (nearby Abu Simbel), Toshka, Kalabsha Al-Gadid, 
Beshayer El-Kheir, Tomas wa Afie, Garf Hussein, Wadi Al-Amal, Wadi Seyala, Emada El-
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Soboua, and Qoustal and Adindan. These areas are sites of contestation that bring to light some 
of the continuing effects of development on Nubians today. 
Language of “Right to Return” 
While many Nubians call for the “right to return” to Old Nubia, the language behind this demand 
is hardly homogenous within the Nubian community. The way Nubians in Cairo, for example, 
speak of the right to return can differ from the way groups in Aswan do. Nubian activists engage 
with a number of different frameworks in order to advocate this claim. Many groups, for 
example, tie this claim to the Palestinian struggle to return to their land in historic Palestine. This 
connection is implicit in the use of the phrase “right to return,” which is associated with this 
Palestinian demand.
285
 It is coincidental but not insignificant that 15 May marks important days 
of commemorating displacement for both groups. For Palestinians, this date marks “Nakba Day,” 
an annual event for Palestinian commemoration of their displacement. For Nubians, 15 May is a 
day for commemorating the 1963-1964 “tahgir” or displacement, which began on that day.  
Clearly, there are many connections to the Palestinian relocation that Nubians both explicit and 
implicitly draw in their calls for “right to return.” The Nubian Democratic Youth Union 
(NDYU), for example, features a post on its website entitled “The Right to Return is Not Only 
Palestinian.” The post responds to the claims of another article titled “The Right to Return is 
Palestinian and Not Nubian,” found on a website called the “Journal of Arab Consciousness” (a 
webpage seemingly devoted to celebrating Nasser).
286
 The Nasserist post makes a number of 
arguments rejecting the use by Nubians of a “right to return” language. It argues that Nubia is not 
a freestanding, separate nation fighting against an occupying enemy, and that “right to return” is 
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officially associated with UN resolution 194 for Palestinian refugees.
287
 The article contends that 
displacement due to the High Dam benefited Nubians as well. It warns against “Zionist” plots to 
divide Egypt and the rest of the Middle East into various sectarian states, which Nubians should 
not be co-opted into. In response, the NDYU argues that the right to return is a principle in 
international law, codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). According to these protocols, the 
NDYU argues, anyone has the right to return and access the country of their origin, whether or 
not they were forcibly removed.
288
 The Union cites the population of Suez Canal, which was 
displaced after the 1967 war, but then allowed to return to their homes in 1973, underscoring that 
the “right to return” is not just a Palestinian issue.  
In the quest to realize various Nubian demands, such as the right to return to Lake Nasser, 
Nubians also employ a minority framework. This framework, which the Egyptian state implicitly 
rejects,
289
 borrows from internationally-recognized declarations instead. The Nubian Knights 
group, for example, routinely cites the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by UN General Assembly 
resolution 47/135 in December 1992, as justification for Nubians’ right to return as minorities in 
Egypt. They site, for example, Article 5, which states that planned national policies and 
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programs should be carried out with the interests of minorities in mind, and that the planning and 
implementation of those programs should occur with consideration of minority interests.
290
 They 
also cite Article 2, which states that minorities have the right to participate in decisions 
concerning their respective minority group and the region in which they live.
291
 For the Nubian 
Knights, this means that Nubians should be able to participate in decisions involving their region, 
such as the selling of lands.
292
 In order to assert Egypt’s obligation to these international codes, 
they cite Article 93 of the 2014 constitution, which states that “The State shall be bound by the 
international human rights agreements, covenants and conventions ratified by Egypt, and which 
shall have the force of law after publication in accordance with the prescribed conditions.”293  
Alongside references to minority rights, some Nubians also engage with indigenous 
discourses when arguing for the right to return to the lake. A good example of this is a 2010 
petition submitted by the Egyptian Center for Housing Rights (ECHR) to the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights as they completed their periodic review of the status of human 
rights in Egypt. Although the ECHR, formerly based in Cairo, targeted a large range of housing 
issues across Egypt, its former director, Manal Al-Tibi, is a well-known Nubian activist. 
Currently serving on the National Council for Human Rights, established following the 30 June 
popularly-backed coup, Al-Tibi works closely with state institutions. As a member of the 2012 
constitutional committee under former president Mohamed Morsi, she was the first of many to 
withdraw in protest of the constitution’s content. The ECHR report cites Common Article 1 of 
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in addition to ICCPR Article 27 
of the ICCPR as the basis of Nubian rights claims. The report argues that Egypt’s government 
has violated a number of Nubian rights, including the right to self determination, the right to their 
original land and natural resources, their collective and individual rights to adequate housing, 
among other rights.
294
 The report articulates a “serious disregard” with which successive 
Egyptian governments have handled Nubian demands to return “to their original land,” accusing 
the government of “favoring the logic of investment and profits over the human rights of 
indigenous people (Nubians) in the developmental projects constructed by the State on the banks 
of the lake.”295 The report’s final recommendations demand government recognition of Nubians 
“as an indigenous people who are entitled to peoples’ rights under international human rights 
law.” Government recognition of Nubians as indigenous people, the report argues, is a pre-
condition for the fulfillment of Nubian rights, such as the right to their “traditional land and 
natural recourses and their right to restitution.” This includes the return of the Nubians to their 
“traditional lands around the High Dam Lake,” with new villages bearing the same names of 
their traditional villages.  
“Right to Return” and Development  
Just as Nubians call for their “right of return” by invoking minority and indigenous discourses, 
so too do they mobilize development discourses to this end. The previous chapters showed how 
state and international bodies acting in the name of “development” have impacted Nubian lives, 
often without their consent. While development actors present a narrative of modernization, 
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progress, and prosperity, many Nubians counter that history with their own stories of unsuitable 
living environments, lack of economic opportunities, and stagnated growth since the relocation. 
In the nineties, development scholars began to recognize this reality of development. However, 
as some scholars began to look at development with a deep pessimism, others tried to find a 
balance between rejecting development all together. They produced scholarship that attempted to 
pinpoint what parts of the theory actually “work.” It asserted that a “more positive form of 
development is available,”296 and that the recipients of development “want control of the 
development agenda rather than that they want to reject it all together.”297 Critical scholars of 
development acknowledge this idea as well. Escobar, for example, suggests that the “fact that 
women in many parts of the Third World want modernization has to be taken seriously.” 
However, he cautions that this “modernization” often “means something quite different from 
what it means in the West and has been constructed and reconstructed as part of the development 
encounter.”298 
 As the example of the Egyptian Nubian Development Foundation shows, many Nubians 
embrace concepts such as social and economic development. Almost every Nubian organization 
with an online presence will list some sort of development as among their aims, however vague 
that word may be. In the context of “right to return,” Nubian usage of development discourses 
closely mirrors that of the Egyptian government and international development actors. While, as 
the previous section shows, Nubians engage in a broad range of language to advocate their right 
to relocate to the banks of Lake Nasser, they also powerfully leverage development discourses to 
make this claim. Just as Nasser’s government in the 1960s used the neutral, unthreatening 
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language of development to justify the Nubians’ relocation, so too have Nubians used this 
language to justify their return. 
 As Cooper and others argue, the concept of development is rooted in the colonial 
experience, during which colonial administrations enacted new services in order to quell the 
political and social dissent to colonization. Cooper contends, however, that while “development” 
carried insidious aims with regards to the colonized, the neutral, universal language of 
development ultimately served as a weapon for the colonies to finally end colonial rule. As 
Cooper suggests, “much as one can read the universalism of development discourse as a form of 
European particularism imposed abroad, it can also be read…as a rejection of the fundamental 
premise of colonial rule, a firm assertion of people of all races to participate in global politics 
and lay claim to a globally defined standard of living.”299 Indeed, development, with its tangible 
measures of success, “opened numerous points of contestation within the colonial powers’ own 
discourse.”300 The widespread workers strikes of the 1940s and 1950s, Cooper suggests, prove 
that while a discourse on development emerged from the colonial leadership, it was also “to a 
significant extent forced upon them.” Thus, “the meanings of development reflected the 
engagement of local mobilization with global discourses, and of local discourses with the global 
structure of power.”301 
 Although Cooper speaks about the colonial context, Nasser also used “development” as a 
tool to distract from social and political issues. As previous chapters show, this language was just 
as effective in a post-colonial context, and indeed continues to this day. And just as the colonized 
used development as a tool to achieve their demands, so too can one argue that Nubians have 
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successfully employed this language to articulate their claims from the state. In the words of 
Akhil Gupta, “at the same time that ‘development’ has been employed as a powerful tool of 
domination in the postcolonial era, and as the most important “reason of state” in the Third 
World, it has also been appropriated and reshaped by subaltern groups.”302 Nubians, for their 
part, have used this strategy from the early days of the relocation. In one recounting by Hussein 
Fahim, the SRC anthropologist who conducted the follow-up study on Nubian relocation, 
Nubians turned the language of development back onto the state from a very early moment in 
order to achieve their demands. Writing in 1972, Fahim states  
since relocation to date, the relocatees tend to function as a pressure group on local 
settlement administration through a  sharp and wide complaint-technique with the 
nation’s top officials including the President. Nubians justify their attitude towards the 
government on the grounds that development, as a Nubian local leader once put it, is a 
“Nubian right rather than a government favor”303 
The reports resulting from the 1971-1975 follow up survey echo this sentiment. “Because they 
were forced to leave their homeland,” Tadros writes,  
Nubians strongly believe that development is a right and not a favor….hence, instead of 
showing the appreciation and gratitude expected by the administrators in return for their 
efforts to better the social-economic conditions of the settlers, the Nubians are employing 
tactics of protest and constant criticism against the administration while demanding far 
greater services and privileges than are given to any rural community in the country.”304 
Fahim recounts the same formula of government disdain and Nubians claims to development as a 
right, adding “the settlers have exercised a technique consisting of pressure and protest. If the 
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administration fails to comply with their demands, they protest and thereby become a potential 
source of trouble.”305  
 Just as it was development that first pushed Nubians away from the Nile, so to was it 
development that offered the first possibility of return. In the 1970s, the Aswan Regional 
Planning Authority, which the government established after the dam’s construction to encourage 
local development, began to shift its focus towards lake-side development.  The Egyptian 
government submitted a request for technical and financial assistance from the UNDP, and in 
1975 the Food and Agricultural Agency (FAO) presented a report detailing the prospects for 
development on Lake Nasser. The UNDP/FAO report noted, in particular “excellent prospects” 
for the fishing industry, as well as agricultural potential in terms of amount of arable land and 
variety of potential crops. It suggested settling fishermen on the lake’s banks in order to create a 
mixed economy, as fishermen also had experience in agriculture.
306
 
 When resettled Nubians in Kom Ombo heard about the government’s announcement to 
develop Lake Nasser in line with the UNDP/FAO report, they immediately inquired about the 
possibility of resettling around the lake. They requested that a government authority investigate 
the possibility for a Nubian relocation. Nubians petitioned local authorities for the right to return 
based on earlier government promises and “worsening living conditions in Kom Ombo.” 307 
What is interesting here is not that Nubians requested to be included in this project, but rather 
how they made that demand. As Fahim notes, Nubians first based their claims to a “right to 
return” on the basis of poor living conditions in Kom Ombo and former government promises. 
Once this rights-based claim did not prove to be “fruitful,” however, they “changed their tactics 
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and began to…advocate their willingness to take part in the implementation of the lake-
development plans.” Realizing that their rights claim on the basis of being a displaced people 
was not effective, they turned to the language of development instead. With that, the Nubians 
pitched themselves to the government as able developers for the lake region, offering, for 
example, the formation of a Nubian-funded and managed agricultural cooperative in order to 
settle and cultivate around the lake.
308
  
The intersection between Nubian demands for a right to return and Nubian demands for 
development continues today. The 2010 ECHR report to the UN, for example, includes a special 
section concerning “The Economic Situation and the Right to Work.” It argues that due to a 
“lack of development projects” from which Nubians can benefit, Nubians face “poor economic 
conditions.”309 As part of the report’s final recommendations, it demands “the right of Nubians to 
development,” including “establishing and assisting Nubians to establish development projects 
that can benefit them.”310 In her 2013 reflections titled “Being Nubian in Egypt, and in the 
Constitution,” Nubian activist Fatma Emam highlights the direct link between right of return 
discourses and development. During the amendment of the 2012 constitution, Emam worked for 
the consultative office of Haggag Adoul, the prominent Nubian author who represented Nubians 
in the fifty-member constitution committee. During this time, Emam encountered the 
“complexity of the Nubian question,” learning for the first time all the different ways different 
Nubians frame their demands. Stating “I had naively thought that the demand for returning back 
to the old land was dogmatic,” Emam reveals her new perspective when she states “I learned, 
however, that when Nubians speak of the right of return, they mean to be granted the right to 
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develop and reside in the land around the lake [Lake Nasser] – a demand that is not unrealistic or 
dogmatic at all.”311Here, Emam shows how the language of development is essential to some 
Nubians’ claims of a “right to return” to their old land. Continuing on, Emam states 
Typical of all plights of return following displacement, I always wondered whether we 
can really do that, whether we – given the choice – would want to return, and whether 
there would be a decent life for our sons and daughters there. But I was amazed and 
humbled when I listened to the sincere voices of those looking forward to developing the 
land of their ancestors, to build their own history and preserve their cultural and 
geographic heritage. I came to realize that there are serious attempts to develop the land 
near the lake, some of which are extremely promising.”312 
Remarking on her frustration with Sameh Ashour, who presided over the constitutional session 
on the Nubian question, Emam quotes Ashour’s dismissal of Nubian demands when he stated 
“Why do you ask for a right of return? Is there a land to return to? I thought that it has all 
drowned under the lake!” Emam’s retort to these “dismissive questions” was again to frame 
Nubian demands for right to return under a development framework. She states that “his 
dismissive questions only showed that he was not familiar with our cause at all. No one wants to 
return to the land that has drowned under the lake: Nubians want to develop the land around it – 
a phrase we said over and over again.”313 Similarly, when listing Nubian demands in the 
constitution, Emam includes “the right to return to the land of Nubia (around the lake)… [and 
that] the population be consulted in the decision-making process for the development of their 
land.”314 Of the constitution’s “triumphs,” Emam notes the “article pertaining to the development 
of remote areas of the nation like Nubia, Sinai and Matrouh, a development that should be done 
in consultation with the inhabitants of those areas.” While the constitution did not settle all of the 
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Nubian’s demands, Emam states that “we did achieve a legal precedent, and we dared to speak of 
our right of return, which is unprecedented.”315 
Nubians Who Explicitly Reject a Development Framework 
 As a result of the efforts of Emam and others on the Nubian committee during the 
constitution’s drafting, the 2014 Egyptian constitution includes one article that mentions 
Nubians. The 2014 document marks the first time that the word “Nubia” has appeared in the 
Egyptian constitution. However, while the article names Nubians, it is foremost an article about 
development. Article 236 of the 2014 constitution states: 
The State shall guarantee setting and implementing a plan for the comprehensive 
economic and urban development of border and underprivileged areas, including Upper 
Egypt, Sinai, Matrouh, and Nubia. This shall be made with the participation of the 
residents of these areas in these development projects, and they shall be given a priority 
in benefiting therefrom, taking into account the cultural and environmental patterns of the 
local community, within ten years from the date that this constitution comes into effect, 
as regulated by Law. The State shall work on setting and implementing projects to bring 
back the residents of Nubia to their original territories and develop such territories within 
ten years, as regulated by Law.
316
 
Many Nubians see Article 236 as an important milestone, given that it marks the first time 
constitution-drafters in Egypt have ever included the term “Nubia.” It also offers the promise of 
inclusive or collaborative development, a prominent model informing development agencies 
today. However, the article is not for Nubians alone. Rather, it applies to a full range of 
“underprivileged” groups, which includes such diverse groups as the North Coast’s Bedouin 
community and Nubia’s close neighbors in Upper Egypt. The article is also, importantly, just 
that: a stipulation of Egypt’s new constitution, against which new laws may be measured and 
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implemented. It will be the law that actually regulates the content of this article, and stipulates 
the ways in which it might be enacted. 
 Many Nubians also reject the article for its emphasis on development. This underscores 
that development claims are not the only way to advocate rights, and indeed some Nubians reject 
this strategy. The Egyptian Nubian Association for Lawyers (ENAL), for example, dislikes the 
article explicitly for the fact that it links the Nubian right to return to nation-wide development 
agendas. According to ENAL, the article is written in a “complicated way” that “serves the 
interests of the state, and not the interests of Nubians.” As ENAL head Mounir Bashir explains, 
the article gives Nubians the right to return to their land by way of development projects. 
However, Bashir contends, Nubians should and will return to this land “because Nubians are not 
a ‘project’ and they have rights.” As the original land owners, Bashir argues, Nubians have the 
right to return – full stop. If Nubians want to return to Lake Nasser and spend their days lounging 
in a chair, they have the full right to do so, Bashir argues. “The Nubian right to return is a human 
right, and not a right based on development,” he adds.317 
The ENAL has prepared two draft laws that would allow for the resettlement of Nubians 
around Lake Nasser on different terms. The first law details an implementation plan for the 
relocation of Nubians to Lake Nasser. The second calls for the establishment of a public, 
independent body to administer Nubian issues, in particular their resettlement around the lake 
and the reconstruction and development of the lake area. According to the draft law, this body 
would be called the High Authority for the Development of the Lake’s Shores and Old Nubia. 
Although it can seek input from state ministries, decision-making authority would ultimately rest 
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with the body, whose headquarters would be in Aswan. In addition, all land “belonging to 
Nubia” would fall under the body’s jurisdiction. 
 Unsurprisingly, the state has refused the release of this law, Bashir says, and although 
the group will present it to the new parliament once it is elected, “there will be problems.” 
“There will be a conflict when we release this law to the parliament, and there will be conflict 
between us and the state,” he added. “This is because [the state] has special interests, and these 
special obligations are to businessmen.” Already, Bashir alleges, Egypt’s security apparatus has 
voiced its opposition, and the Ministry of Agriculture has refused the independent body because 
the ministry would lose its authority “to take the land and sell it to investors.” According to 
Bashir, former president Mohamed Morsi had agreed to both draft laws, and ENAL was awaiting 
the upcoming parliamentary elections for confirmation before the military ousted Morsi. 
National, International Development Agendas and the Nubian Right to Return 
Nubians list a number of locations to which they would like to return along the banks of Lake 
Nasser. Not all Nubians agree on all of these locations, but there are several overlaps. The final 
section of this chapter looks at some of the areas that Nubians list as viable spots for their return 
to the Lake. The battles over these areas, both between Nubians and the state and among 
Nubians, provide insight into the main issues at stake in the quest to return. In the majority of 
places that Nubians wish to return, an existing development project exists that excludes Nubian 
participation. These sites of contestation bring to light some of the issues Nubians face in calling 
for their “right to return,” revealing a disparity in who actually has the “right to develop.” 
Toshka 
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A number of the locations on the table for Nubian relocation are part of long-term development 
plan by the Egyptian government in the New Valley (Wadi Al-Gedid) Governorate. At the center 
of this development scheme is the Toshka project, which began in 1997 as part of former 
president Mubarak’s plan to reclaim vast swaths of land in Egypt’s western desert. The Egyptian 
government argues that Toshka is a national project that serves all Egyptians and does not give 
preference to any one group. From local newspaper articles to development reports, the vast 
literature available on the Toshka project rarely, if ever, mentions Nubians. The government 
officials I spoke to were surprised when I asked about Nubians and Toshka – not because I had 
hit on a controversial topic, but because they truly had no idea that this was an issue. Toshka is in 
every way decidedly not about Nubians. And yet, curiously, “Toshka” is a Nubian name. The 
original Toshka is a Fadicca-speaking Nubian village in the South, far away from the northern 
Toshka project of today. If you search “Toshka” on Facebook, you will not find references to 
Egypt’s mega-project but rather to solidarity groups for Toshka-hailing Nubians in the Diaspora. 
While the Egyptian government may deny any Nubian stake in the Toshka project, the name is 
an enduring reminder that Nubians used to live in this region but now they do not. 
 Of the possible places for Nubian resettlement, Toshka is one of the more contentious 
ones. To be sure, many Nubians have lobbied intensely for their right to have priority in 
resettlement within this mega-project. The largest landholder in Toshka is Saudi Prince Alwaleed 
bin Talal, whose Kingdom Agricultural Development Company purchased some 100,000 
feddans in 1998. In 2010, a number of Nubian activists and other human rights groups joined 
lawyer Shehata Mohamed in a lawsuit against Al-Waleed’s Toshka contract, arguing that it 
violated Egyptian desert development laws. According to the lawsuit, Talal’s contract with the 
Egyptian government allowed him to obtain seeds without the permission of Egyptian 
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authorities, hire a foreign labor force without restriction, cultivate any crops of his choosing, 
carry out cultivation without a set timeline, and export any and all produce outside of Egypt. The 
lawsuit cited Law 290 of 1990, which specifies a maximum period of three years for investors to 
begin cultivating desert land. Law 290 also stipulates a minimum purchase rate of forty Eygptian 
pounds per feddan for desert land plots without services and 100 Egyptian pounds for served 
areas.
318
  At fifty Egyptian pounds per feddan, Talal bought his Toshka land well below that 
rate.
319
 The Nubian activists participating in the lawsuit framed their objections to the project in 
nationalist terms. Because the Talal contract guarantees him two percent of Egypt’s share of the 
Niles waters, Manal Al-Tibi argued, “the main aim is to steal Egyptian water and create a state 
within a state.” Solieman Nour, the head of the Nubian Toshka Association, stated “we demand 
the annulment of this contract for the sake of Egypt” adding that Nubians had a special place in 
this appeal due to their “right as original inhabitants of the land in its ownership.” In an interview 
about the case, Al-Tibi told Daily News Egypt that 13,000 Nubian families were expelled from 
Toshka in order to open the land for investors. In addition, Al-Tibi argued that general policy 
was in place effectively banning Nubians from owning any land there.
320
 In addition to this case, 
many Nubians have argued in the Egyptian media that they were given insufficient land in this 
project. In April 2011, for example, Nubian activists told Al-Masry Al-Youm that the 3700 
feddans allocated to Nubians in Toshka was “unfair,” and, according to Haggag Adoul, a 
“continuation of the government’s exclusion of Nubians.”321 One Nubian from Aswan city said 
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that with the price Talaal paid for the land, he would have bought ten feddans for himself, if only 
given the chance. 
 Although many Nubians have publicly fought for their right to participate and live in 
Toshka, the reality is that life in Toshka is hard. One Nubian from Aswan, who worked in 
Toshka for five years as a motor-boat driver for a British company, said many Nubians were 
employed there to service the water pump and other electrical infrastructure. However, he said, 
to be a farmer you need a lot of money, because the land is sandy and requires a substantial 
amount of fertilizer. Nubian small farmers, without the backing of a large investor, would find it 
impossible to cultivate the land. Given Toshka’s location and high temperatures, those  who 
work there say that the quality of life is poor and the work exhausting. In addition to the general 
undesirability of living in Toshka, many Nubians reject the project simply because they do not 
wish to participate in private land-grabs masked as national development. When the Egyptian 
Nubian Association of Lawyers criticizes the Nubia article in the constitution, it is because of 
what they have witnessed in development projects such as Toshka. Although the article is written 
as though it concerns Nubian participation in development, Mounir Bashir says, what it is really 
talking about – and how it will actually be implemented on the ground – is the establishment of 
new governorates and projects such as Toshka. As Bashir notes, the creation of new governorates 
is a major talking point for Egypt’s newly-elected President Sisi, and “this is what they’re really 
talking about in this article, [projects like] Toshka is what is going to happen.” “Toshka is for 
businessmen, for foreigners” Bashir says, “not Nubians.” According to Bashir, the Egyptian state 
once wanted to make a law to resettle Nubians in Toshka. However, he argues that this proposed 
law was in the same spirit as the constitution’s new article, meaning to populate the area and 
establish a steady workforce. As such, Bashir said, “we don’t want to take part in Toshka…and 
120 
 
we refused that.” It is telling that Toshka is one of the six places that Egyptian Nubian 
Development Foundation head Herki lists as potential places for Nubian resettlement. As a 
prominent, powerful Nubian who regularly consults with the state and has an interest in 
development, which some contend is fueled by ulterior, personal business motives, it is not 
surprising that he might support such a project. 
More than anything, it seems, the corrupt, failed Toshka scheme underscores that projects 
enacted in the name of the national good do not always serve this aim, and many Nubians believe 
that they have the most to lose in these endeavors. Even though the ENAL does not care about 
Toshka, and it does not call for Nubians to relocate there, the organization is upset with many 
elements of the scheme that may be generalized to other development projects as well. A 
particular point of contention is the water rights that the Egyptian government gave Talal in 
order to irrigate the crops in Toshka. One major justification that the state uses to prevent 
Nubians resettlement and cultivation around the lake is that Egypt’s water is too scarce. “The 
state brought water to Toshka, and when we demanded from the state that we take our land, they 
refused to give us water from the lake,” Bashir explained. Toshka is not the only private Saudi 
land reclamation scheme that takes water from Lake Nasser only to export the resulting crops 
abroad. The Saudi company Loha administers another project much closer to the lake than 
Toshka, which Bashir says has cultivated 5,000 feddans of land and also “takes a large 
percentage of water.” The Loha project is located next to Bechayer el-Kheir, a welfare village 
that the Egyptian government established with support from the World Food Programme. The 
physical differences between the Saudi scheme and the state welfare village are clear even from 
a distance. Loha, with its substantial financial and technical resources, appears much more 
vibrant than the Bechayer el-Kheir whose aim is to support Egypt’s poor.  
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Wadi Karkar 
When the Egyptian government forced the relocation of 50,000 Nubians in Egypt in order to 
build the High Dam, it relocated many of those Nubians to New Nubia in Kom Ombo, about an 
hour from Aswan city. However, the 1963-1964 relocation resettled only those Nubians who 
were physically present to register for compensation in former Nubia. Nubians living in other 
parts of Egypt (such as Cairo or Alexandria for work) or outside of the country at the time did 
not receive this initial compensation. In addition, the government measured compensation by 
family, rather than by individual property holdings. So if one family owned five houses in old 
Nubia, they only received one house in New Nubia. In order to provide compensation for those 
Nubians who did not receive it in the sixties – some 5,221 families, the ECHR estimates – the 
government has recently completed a new housing site in Wadi Karkar, about thirty-five minutes 
away from Aswan city (near South Valley University, on the Abu Simbel Road). 
 Many Nubians have vocally opposed the Nubian housing in Wadi Karkar. The 2010 
ECHR report to the UN, for example, cites a lack of consultation with Nubian community 
leaders regarding location, design, or economic activity in the villages. The ECHR report 
highlights the use of cement in the buildings, which is “not culturally appropriate for Nubians.” 
The ECHR report states that Nubians have repeatedly voiced concerns about the method of 
building and the location, but the government has not accounted for those demands.
322
 In 
addition, it argues that the government’s agreement to build new villages only for 
uncompensated Nubians does not address the “right to return” needs of many other Nubians 
resettled in 1963-64. The report argued that Nubian claims for “right to return” to Lake Nasser is 
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a “natural extension” of the existing resettlement scheme in Kom Ombo, “which is by no means 
suitable to preserve Nubian culture or to absorb the natural extension of Nubian families.”323  
 Wadi Karkar is another location on which Herki and the Egyptian Nubian Association for 
Lawyers disagree. In the ENAL’s eyes, Wadi Karkar is just another development scheme in 
which the government encourages settlement for ultimately national gains. When the government 
announced the decision to build the Nubian housing in Wadi Karkar, the Nubian Lawyers 
Association held a press conference against it. They argued that although the settlement was 
supposed to be agricultural, the rocky soil in Karkar meant that no cultivation could occur at the 
site. For three months, Bashir says, the government worked on an alternative site in Wadi Amal, 
some twenty kilometers from Wadi Karkar and only seven kilometers from Lake Nasser (Wadi 
Amal is a common place that Nubians list for return). With time, however, the government 
relocated the project back to Wadi Karkar, putting Wadi Amal back under the army’s jurisdiction 
and its agricultural land ultimately in the hands of businessmen. According to Bashir, the 
Nubians “only get desert; the land that needs work goes to the Nubians.” In order to prevent 
degradation, Egyptian law prevents the establishment of villages within five kilometer’s of the 
lakes shores, meaning Wadi Amal is rather close to Lake Nasser at seven kilometers in. Wadi 
Karkar, however, is sixteen kilometers from the lake. “Desert” is perhaps an apt term to describe 
the location; in fact, on the way to visit from Aswan city, I passed a film called Desert in the 
middle of shooting. Wadi Karkar is located on the Abu Simbel Road, and in order to get there 
you must pass a small army checkpoint. The nearby gas station is manned by army personnel, 
including an armored personnel carrier parked at its entrance. The road to Wadi Karkar is 
peppered with other army establishments, which bear signs in both English and Arabic warning 
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against taking pictures. In sum, Wadi Karkar is in a rather militarized zone, at the very least one 
that does not now seem conducive to a flexible and convenient life in and around Aswan city. 
Although the site is not completely finished, several stages have been completed, none of which 
include agricultural land. What does exist in terms of housing and public services is actually 
quite impressive: villages all in the same Nubian style, distinguished by paint color, each 
containing a large mosque, schools, markets for shopping (although no stores exist yet), in 
addition to an enormous and architecturally cohesive medical center. However, on my visit, I 
saw very few Nubians actually using the space; in general, the vast complex was still empty. 
According to some Nubians, those who have received compensation in Karkar have already long 
established lives elsewhere, and they are unlikely to forsake their homes and livelihood to move 
to an isolated place with no work opportunities. Apparently, many Nubians are selling their 
homes in Karkar to non-Nubians as soon as they get the key, meaning that Karkar may one day 
become a mixed or non-Nubian area altogether. 
World Food Program Villages 
Toshka is not the only national development project from which many Nubians feel excluded. 
Far more than Toshka, Nubians would like to inhabit three villages that the Egyptian government 
established in the early 2000s for impoverished Egyptians across the country. The three villages, 
which are sometimes referred to as the World Food Program villages, include Kalabsha El-
Gadid, Bechayer El-Kheir (and the adjacent Garf Hussein), and Tomas wa Afie. These villages 
are located about an hour and a half (Kalabsha El-Gadid, Beshayer El-Kheir) to three hours 
(Tomas wa Afie) south of Aswan city. The World Food Program’s association with these 
villages is significant. Although both the WFP and Egyptian government officials emphasize that 
these are national projects, many if not most Nubians (and several misinformed development 
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reports) believe that the WFP has substantial influence in their administration. It is not too hard 
to see how people came to this conclusion; the WFP insignia is virtually everywhere throughout 
the villages. The Egyptian government office in Aswan that administers the villages is the 
Executive Agency for the Comprehensive Development Projects (EACDP), a part of the 
MOALR. Their offices in Aswan city are also thoroughly marked with WFP logos, and the 
official letterhead indicates that this office is directly tasked with administering World Food 
Program aid, providing an interesting insight into the creation of new bureaucracy in order to 
facilitate international aid. 
 According to the WFP’s Cairo office, the WFP is no longer involved in the welfare 
villages’ project (which the EACDP calls “Enabling Livelihoods and Asset Creation of the Rural 
Poor Project, High Dam Lake). Up until 2013, the WFP provided only food supply to the 
villages, with no direct monetary support and no voice in the administration.
324
 All of the 
Nubians I spoke with, however, are convinced that this project has a more insidious history. 
According to them, the WFP approached the Egyptian government with the desire to build 
villages just for Nubians, a request that the Egyptian government rejected. Some go as far as to 
say that the Egyptian government attempted to deceive the WFP by naming the villages after 
Nubian villages: just like Toshka, Garf Hussein, Tomas w Afie, Kalabsha, and Beshayer el Khier 
are all names of relocated Nubian villages. Regardless of the veracity of these claims, these 
perceptions have serious implications for how Nubians view the project. They feel, in particular, 
that a severe injustice was leveraged against them in the name of national development and with 
international complicity. At a 2007 conference held in Cairo titled “Nubia between Resettlement 
and Development,” Haggag Addoul bemoaned that “despite promises that the Nubians will have 
                                                          
324
 Interview by author, Cairo, Egypt, 3 June, 2014. 
125 
 
priority in settling there [the Lake Nasser welfare villages], the government is bringing in 
peasants from all over the country.” According to Addoul, this was not a mistake, but rather a 
“systematic trend to eradicate Nubian culture, traditions, and language.”325 This perception 
persists today and is linked to an experience of dispassion and marginalization. 
 The Egyptian government, for its part, is very clear on the fact that this project is 
intended for all Egyptians and not just Nubians. When the villages first opened, Suzanne Kamal, 
then-director of the EACDP Lake Nasser Program, told Al-Ahram’s French language newspaper 
that “the goal of this project is not just agricultural, but also social: to bring together in one place 
peasants who are originally from governorates all across Egypt. Here, it is forbidden to refer to a 
farmer by their origin (Nubian, Aswani, Eskanderani, or other).”326 Government officials use the 
same line today. When I asked an employee of the Lake Nasser Development Authority whether 
or not this land in question was for Nubians, he responded with a resounding “no” (several times 
over). This project is for “all Egyptian people,” he clarified, “this area is for all Egyptian 
people.”327 The current director of the EACDP’s Lake Nasser program is equally clear on the 
matter. The “rural poor” are the main target for this project, he said, and among the selection 
criteria is that applicants be unmarried, healthy (free of HIV or Hepatitis C), younger than fifty 
(for men, and under forty-five for women), and, importantly, without any land ownership, home 
ownership, or employment to their name. It is individual governorates that present possible 
candidates for selection, and although there are people from all over Egypt represented in the 
villages, preference is given to Upper Egyptian residents from places such as Luxor and Aswan. 
The government, he said, built the entire village infrastructure and funds all of its employees, 
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from the water pump engineers to the social workers. The WFP, when it was still involved in the 
project, provided foodstuffs such as wheat, oil, rice, and sugar.
328
 
 While Toshka on the whole seems like an entirely unappealing place to live, it is easier to 
see why Nubians would like to move to these Lake Nasser villages. When I visited in June, the 
end of the growing season, I saw a diverse number of crops in cultivation, including lemons, 
peppers, basil, onions, mangos, guava, and much more. The villages boast a full range of 
government services, from schools to small shops. I met with the social workers who are based 
in the villages full-time, and they described the work they do with the residents, including 
regular town-hall meetings to hear demands and complaints. The large meeting room in 
Kalabsha Al-Gadid is adorned with WFP logos. The director of a women’s outreach program in 
Beshayer El-Khier (herself a village resident) proudly described to me the small economic 
activities for women she runs, such as clothes-making, in addition to farming her own land. 
Having their own land was a great source of pride for the residents I spoke with. The residential 
areas resemble Wadi Karkar to a degree, with homes loosely based on Nubian architecture. 
However they are older and much less nice in appearance. Inside the homes I saw, residents had 
filled their rooms with personal furniture and other individual touches, but small animals and 
relentless flies prevailed in common areas. Piles of dirty dishes, as well as rudimentary toilets, 
led me to believe that household water is not abundantly available. There is also no electricity in 
the villages, which are run entirely on generators. As the program director explained, one of the 
biggest obstacles the project faces is a lack of resources. There is simply not enough money 
going into the project for all that it is trying to achieve. In terms of Nubian demands to return to 
the lake in particular, it is worth noting that Lake Nasser is not even visible from Kalabsha Al-
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Gadid; there is only a small offshoot canal for pumping and irrigation purposes. The view of 
Lake Nasser from Beshayer El-Kheir, however, is breath-taking in its vastness. Indeed, former 
president Sadat built a small palace nearby because he loved the area so much, though it is no 
longer in use. However, even this village is still at least seven kilometers from the Lake, meaning 
that you cannot simply walk up to the water without a fully-powered car. There are villages in 
New Nubia that are closer to the Nile than any of the above projects mentioned (although, to be 
fair, most of them are much further away). The drive to the closet village – Kalabsha Al-Gedid, 
some one hundred kilometers from Aswan city, takes well over an hour and is one long stretch of 
sand and strange circular army installations designed to detect planes. Despite these shortfalls, 
Nubians believe they have a right to settle this land. In light of the government’s decision to 
resettle Egyptians from across the country in the welfare villages, Nubians view these villages as 
another example of state-led marginalization and dispossession.  
Qoustal and Adindan 
Qoustal and Adindan are two former Nubians villages close to the border with Sudan on the right 
bank of the Nile. Adindan has a special significance as the last Nubian village before Sudan. I 
was first exposed to these areas as potential spots for relocation from a film titled “Erki,” about a 
young Nubian from Cairo who wishes to resettle in Old Nubia. Calling the area the “Land of 
Gold,” the Nubian protagonist runs his fingers through the soil of Qoustal as he states “this land 
isn’t completely deserted as people believe it to be.” Just like the rest of “Nubia,” he says “this 
place needs attention and care. Like palm trees, it needs water; it needs to feel your love and in 
return you will feel its presence.” During the documentary, the narrator visits a man living in 
Qoustal and Adindan who tells him “this land has a lot of opportunities for youth, because once 
we start getting the trade going, we’re going to need a large labor force,” adding, “I don’t want 
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Nubians to just come here to work, I want them also to get married and live here.” The Nubian 
resident of Qoustal and Adindan concludes by stating: “some say this is impossible, but for many 
other who lived in Old Nubia, this is not a problem. It’s not hard to start a life here and start 
reconstructing the land.”329 
There is a lot of different and sometimes contradictory information available on 
development in this region. According to an employee at the Lake Nasser Development 
Authority, there is a national project currently in progress in this area. A large map on the LNDA 
office’s wall indicated state activity in Qoustal and Adindan. Because Qoustal and Adindan are 
so close to the border, it may be security concerns that restrict access to information on these 
projects. Considering the large security presence surrounding the desert development schemes 
further from the border, this would not be too surprising. Karkar, for example, is on army-owned 
land. Indeed, when I asked the Lake Nasser Development Authority employee about state 
activity in this area, he immediately became suspicious of my questions and casually informed 
me that “Lake Nasser is a dangerous place to study.”330 According to Bashir, Qoustal and 
Adindan is not part of a state development project but rather an attempt at a free trade zone 
between Egypt and Sudan, which is currently dormant “because of [Egypt’s] current relations 
with Sudan.” Bashir also says that there are some private companies for lifestock slaughter there. 
Although the area does not have electricity, the butcher shops have electricity, Bashir says, “and 
corruption as well!”331 Contributing to the confusion, an employee at the MALR in Aswan 
believes that there will be a 5,000-feddan agricultural project in Qoustal and Adindan, “maybe 
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soon,” exclusively for Nubians.332 Bashir, in response, says this is another typical state promise 
whereby if a region has 10,000 feddans of land, the 5,000 feddans that are fertile will go to the 
state, and the 5,000 infertile ones go to Nubians, in addition to restrictions on access to water. 
Conclusion 
Since the 1963-1964 relocation, Nubians have taken an active role in dictating their own 
development agendas. Nubians were not passive recipients of development, but rather saw their 
development as a “right” which the Egyptian state was responsible for ensuring. Nubian 
development preferences are diverse and represent a full range of development theory. The way 
Nubians from Aswan talk about development, for example, may be totally different from the 
ways in which Nubians in Cairo do. There are divisions within these regional distinctions as 
well. The Egyptian Nubian Development Foundation, for example, represents an older, well-
established generation in the Nubian community. They have connections to the state as well as 
resources. Its leader, Mosaad Herki, has taken a picture with every Egyptian president since 
Mubarak’s ouster. The Nubian Knights group, and other Nubian groups that rely primarily on 
social media to publicize their platform, are more grassroots in their organization. These groups 
are younger, and can be more oppositional to the state’s policies towards Nubians. I met several 
Nubian Knights members, for example, at a small April sit-in outside the Journalist’s Syndicate 
in Cairo, where they were demanding less biased media coverage of clashes between Nubian and 
Arab tribes in Aswan. This was at a time (still ongoing) when many young people in Cairo 
feared to gather in protest, due to the state’s recently-enacted law restricting public assembly. 
Needless to say, there are a number of different factors and conditions influencing Nubians and 
their approach to development, and there is hardly a homogenous Nubian view on the subject. 
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 The question of the Nubian “right to return” to their former lands around Lake Nasser, 
however, brings to light some of the limits of a rights-based discourse such as the “right to 
develop.” The Egyptian government based its intervention in Nubia on the premise of 
development, arguing that the Nubians were not developed but needed to be. However, when 
Nubians make claims from the state using development discourses, the conversation changes. 
Nubians have made many development-based arguments for their right to return. Some argue 
that as the original settlers on the land, Nubians are best equipped and most devoted to 
developing the region properly. Others argue that state policies have been inefficient in ensuring 
the Nubians’ development, proposing their own alternatives. However, Nubians as a community 
have remained unable to relocate to even one spot alongside Lake Nasser’s shores. That is not to 
say that development in these regions is not possible: as this chapter shows, there are several 
government initiatives to resettle and develop along the lake. At the three welfare villages 
(commonly referred to as the “WFP” villages), the Egyptian government has done exactly the 
kind of development Nubians would like to see on their former lands, except for the fact that 
Egyptians from across the country are living there instead. When Nubians produce their own 
proposals for development and relocation sites, the state refuses them access to the most basic 
necessities such as water which would allow that development to occur. At the same time, 
foreign investment schemes such as Toshka or the Loha project are contractually guaranteed to a 
significant share of the Nile’s waters. These schemes can also be called “successful” 
development projects in the region, but the development they entail is not for Egyptians and it is 
most certainly not for Nubians. Thus, these potential sites for Nubian return represent important 
points of contestation in the battle over who really has the “right to develop.”
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Conclusion 
From the Aswan dams in the early 1900s to the Toshka project of today, Nubians have watched 
development projects transform their land for over one hundred years. When Nasser began plans 
to construct the Aswan High Dam in the 1960s, he relocated some 50,000 Egyptian Nubians 
from their historic homes in the name of development. Egypt’s Nubians thus became Egyptian 
citizens at an important juncture in Egypt’s history. After decades of informal British 
administration, Egypt under Nasser sought to usher in a new era of sovereignty for the country. 
Nasser defined this sovereignty through modernity, technological prowess, and expertise. The 
symbol of this sovereignty was the High Dam. 
 
 Thus, from its very inception, the High Dam was about a lot more than just development. 
Likewise, the Nubian relocation was not merely an act of taking an “undeveloped” people and 
“developing” them. Rather, Nasser’s newly-sovereign state constituted its very identity through 
these activities. The Egyptian government expanded its influence over groups of people who had 
previously lived semi-autonomously, such as the Nubians. By providing services and assuming 
total welfare of the Nubians, the state assumed authority over these formerly peripheral people. 
Through population counts and voter registration, the Egyptian government found a way to 
quantify the Nubians and incorporate them into the state’s national development goals.  
 
 Development in Nasser’s Egypt also had political underpinnings. Nubians were relocated 
without their consent and with little consultation, leaving behind their homes, community 
structures, and treasured way of life along the Nile. It was a situation ripe for political dissent as 
Nasser established the early years of his rule. And yet, many Nubians celebrated the High Dam 
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at the time, as saw themselves as making a valuable sacrifice for the sake of the nation. It 
harkens back to the colonial period, when French and British colonial administrators employed 
development to quell growing social and political unrest during the waning years of their rule. 
 
 The Egyptian government was not alone in constructing Nubia’s development agenda. 
Rather, it borrowed from increasingly globalized theories on state administration. Western 
organizations such as the Ford Foundation played an important role in codifying these theories, 
hoping to streamline state practices across the world. In the mid-twentieth century, both the 
Egyptian government and organizations such as the Ford Foundation saw the Nubians as 
traditional and backwards “objects” of development. These actors saw only one path to 
development, and they did not believe that the Nubians could embark on that path on their own. 
That argument extended to Nubian lands, which the Egyptian government and other 
development actors framed as a barren, empty, desert that needed “taming.” They justified 
intervention on the basis that Nubians were not capable of developing the land themselves. By 
arguing that geography determined Egypt’s problems, these development actors minimized the 
social and political reform that was actually necessary to achieve justice. This is a trend that 
continues to this day, not only on former Nubians lands but across Egypt. 
 
 There is also the reality that for Egypt’s Nubians, years of “development” did not actually 
make their lives better. In fact, in many ways it made their lives considerably worse. For those 
who received compensation from the government, they faced years of sinking houses, cracked 
walls, few opportunities to make money, and little land of their own. Away from the Nile, 
Nubians found themselves plucked from one desert and transported to another. Others did not 
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receive compensation at all. For those Nubians, memories of thriving communities and secure 
lifestyles in Old Nubia did not match up to the government’s narrative of a people struggling to 
survive. If the High Dam or other mega-development schemes helped develop Egypt, it did not 
do the same for the Nubians.  
 
 The Nubian experience with development in Egypt is hardly sufficient to discredit the 
entire notion of development. At the same time, I hesitate to say that if only practiced in the 
“right” way, development might have served the Nubians better. As the historical record of 
development in the colonies shows, Nasser practiced development in the way it was originally 
intended, and it satisfied the goals that it set out to accomplish. As Nasser consolidated his rule, 
the High Dam was a symbol of his power. It was a reminder that Egypt was going to get better, 
even if that change never came. The same was true for Mubarak’s Toshka, only this time 
Egyptians had finally had enough of waiting for social and political reform.  
 
At the most, this research can argue that development over the past century has failed the 
Nubians, if not the rest of Egypt, in many ways. If it sounds the state leveled development as a 
sort of conspiracy against the Nubians, that could be because many Nubians believe that to be 
the case. A significant number of Nubians think that their presence at Egypt’s borders with 
Sudan was a potential security threat, and that Nasser wanted to divide Egypt’s Nubians from 
their Sudanese counterparts. It is a sentiment that is compounded by years of state 
marginalization and dispossession. As Elizabeth Smith writes, “the homogenizing impulse of 
nation-states constructs minority populations as both a necessary ingredient of national identity, 
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and a threat to national unity”333 Nubians continue to fight to preserve their language within the 
community, and to prevent the erasure of Nubian history by putting that history in Egypt’s 
school curriculum. Their fears are not entirely unfounded, as even national media can reinforce 
those claims. A 2005 feature on the cover of Egypt’s Ruz al-Yusuf magazine summarized this 
sentiment among the Egyptian public, writing: “We’re Addressing This Issue: Is Nubia a 
Problem?!”334 
 
Perhaps the most significant testimony to the positive potential of development is that 
many Nubians want it and ask the state to help them achieve it. Despite their negative 
experiences with development, Nubians still engage with the concept. They write their own 
terms and indicators of what development should look like and how to measure it. However, 
Nubian attempts to enact development on their former lands show that development is not 
necessarily a right that all share. As some Nubians link their “right to return” demand to a “right 
to develop,” they find themselves facing a battle on two fronts. Despite the 2014 constitution’s 
article giving Nubians the priority in benefiting from development projects in the region, clear 
and strong laws will be needed to protect against the current reality of development disparity.
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